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In most modern  economies  scientific  and  technological  research  activities  are  conducted  in  two distinct 




driven  societies.  This  paper  considers  the  difference  between  historical  origins  of  open  science  and  its 
modern, critically important role in the allocation of research resources.  The institutional structure of ‘The 
Republic of Open Science’ generally  is  less well understood and has  less robust self‐sustaining foundations 
than the familiar non‐cooperative market mechanisms associated with proprietary R&D.  Although they are 
better  suited  for  the conduct of exploratory  science,  they also  remain more vulnerable  to damages  from 
collateral  effects  of  shifts  in  government  policies,  particularly  those  that  impact  their  fiscal  support  and 
regulatory environments.   After  reviewing  the  several  challenges  that  such policy actions during  the 20th 
century’s  closing  decades  had  posed  for  continued  effective  collective  explorations  at  the  frontiers  of 
scientific  knowledge,  the  discussion  examines  the  responses  that  those  developments  elicited  from 
academic  research communities.   Those  reactions  to  the  threatened curtailment of  timely access  to data 
and  technical  information  about  new  research  methods  and  findings  took  the  form  of  technical  and 
organizational  innovations designed to expand and enhance  infrastructural protections for sustained open 







































long‐term	economic	growth	and	welfare	 improvements.	Yet,	 the	 culture	and	practices	of	
open	 science	 also	 remain	 particularly	 exposed	 and	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 unintended	
consequences	 of	 disturbances	 in	 larger,	 inter‐twinned	 technical,	 institutional,	 economic	
and	 political	 systems	 in	 which	 it	 is	 embedded,	 and	 upon	 which	 it	 depends.	 This	
vulnerability	 became	 apparent	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 past	 three	 decades,	 during	 which	 a	
sustained	movement	strengthened	national	and	 international	 intellectual	property	rights	
protections	and	the	scope	of	those	legal	regimes	to	encompass	much	of	the	now	pervasive	
digital	 information	 environment.1	 	 Restrictions	 on	 timely	 access	 to	 scientific	 data,	
information	 and	 research	 tools	 that	 the	 owners	 of	 legal	 monopoly	 rights	 in	 patents,	
copyrights,	 and	 database	 rights	 were	 able	 to	 impose	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 exacerbating	
problematic	 effects	 of	 other	policies	 affecting	 universities	 and	publicly	 	 funded	 research	
                                                 
*	Like	my	invited	lecture	to	the	Centro	Linceo	Interdisciplinare	Conference	on	23rd	April	2013,	the	second	and	
third	sections	of	this	paper	draw	heavily	upon	material	in	a	much	longer	previous	essay,	David	(2008).	One	
will	 find	 there	 fulsome	 acknowledgement	 of	 my	 intellectual	 debts	 to	 many	 friends	 and	 colleagues	 who	
assisted	my	historical	research	on	the	origins	of	open	science.	Sheila	Ryan	Johansson’s	careful	reading	of	the	
penultimate	draft,	and	her	gift	for	untangling	and	shortening	my	sentences,	greatly	improved	the	exposition	
in	 this	 version.	 I	 am	 grateful	 too	 for	 the	 contributions	 made	 by	 Mario	 Pianta	 to	 the	 organization	 of	 the	
Conference,	 which	 provided	 stimulating	 commentaries	 from	 the	 other	 participants,	 and	 for	 his	 patient	
assistance	in	my	preparation	of	the	present	text	for	publication.			
1	 For	 entry	 points	 to	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 and	 university‐industry	 R&D	










institutes.	 	 In	a	widening	circle	of	 countries	a	variety	of	attempts	were	made	 to	emulate	
particular	features	and	sequelae	of	the	U.S.	Bayh‐Dole	Act	of	1980	‐‐	without	grasping	the	
conjuncture	 of	 special	 circumstances	 and	 purposes	 that	 had	 given	 rise	 to	 that	 piece	 of	
congressional	 legislation.	This	 resulted	 in	 the	 transfer	 to	 their	universities	and	 institutes	
the	 locus	 of	 control	 of	 patenting	 and	 managing	 the	 commercial	 exploitation	 those	 and	
other	intellectual	property	rights	derived	from	publicly	funded	academic	research	findings.		
University	“technology	transfer	offices”	were	thus	promoted	as	agencies	through	which	the	




The	 new	 incentives	 that	were	 created,	 along	with	 the	 legitimating	 “public	 policy”	
rationale	 of	 “transferring	 technologies”	 for	 growth‐stimulating	 private	 investments	 in	
innovation,	 tended	 to	 further	 encourage	 academic	 researchers’	 in	 delaying	 and	 denying	




“academic	 entrepreneurship”	 had	 the	 unintended	 perverse	 effect	 of	 augmenting	 a	 pre‐
existing	chronic	source	of		drag	on	the	pace	of	collective	scientific	advances	of	the	research	
frontier:	it	further	inhibited	the	rapid	verification	of	new	research	findings,	or	their	swift	
qualifications	 and	 correction	 by	 expert	 research	 peers,	 thereby	 impeding	 the	 further	
extension	of	research	based	on	the	latest	theoretical	and	empirical	advances.2	
	The	conditions	just	described	perversely	worked	to	degrade	the	effectiveness	of	the	
scientific	 research	 system	 as	 a	 whole,	 inasmuch	 as	 their	 deleterious	 effects	 were	 not	
confined	 to	 exploratory	 academic	 investigations.	 Considered	 at	 the	macro‐level,	 the	 two	
modes	 in	 which	 scientific	 and	 technical	 research	 activities	 are	 organized	 in	 modern	




                                                 
2 The concluding section’s discussion provides a fuller account of these  and other largely unanticipated and 
dysfunctional ramifications of the Bayh-Dole Act that became increasing visible during the 1980’s, the reactions 
that they eventually elicited from influential sections of the U.S. academic research community.  




may	 amplify	 the	 productivity	 of	 the	 other.	 	 Additions	 to	 the	 body	 of	 reliable	 scientific	
knowledge	renew	and	enhance	the	private	and	societal	payoff	from	applications	oriented	
R&D	seeking	commercially	profitable	innovations.3	
	Yet,	 the	 former	 of	 these	 sub‐systems,	 being	 grounded	 in	 career	 incentives	 and	
norms	of	 scientific	 behavior	 that	 restrain	opportunism	and	 foster	 cooperative	behaviors	
on	the	part	of	researchers	whose	work	is	dependent	on	public	and	private	patronage	for	
support,	 remains	 the	more	 fragile	 of	 the	 pair.	 	 Without	 adequate	material	 support	 and	
reinforcement	of	its	norms	by	the	policies	and	procedures	of	its	primary	funding	agencies,	
the	practice	of	 “open	science”	and	 its	 institutional	 infrastructure	are	vulnerable	 to	being	
undermined	 by	 restricted	 sharing	 of	 “research	 process	 knowledge”	 and	 other	 (non‐
cooperative)	behaviors	motivated	by	the	goal	of	privately	appropriating	economic	“rents”	
from	monopolistic	possession	of	new	scientific	and	technical	information.	
This	 implies	 that	 the	 “balancing	 act”	 for	 public	 policy	 requires	 more	 than	
maintenance	of	public	funding	for	exploratory	research	projects	carried	on	in	universities	
and	public	 institutes.	 It	may	call	 for	deliberate	measures	 to	halt,	and	 in	some	areas	even	
reverse	excessive	incursions	of	claims	to	private	property	rights	over	material	that	would	
otherwise	remain	in	the	public	domain	of	scientific	data	and	information	–	in	other	words,	
for	 the	 protection	 of	 an	 “open	 science	 domain”	 from	 the	 regime	 of	 legal	 protections	 for	
intellectual	 property	 rights,	 and	 the	 individual	 competitive	 impulse	 to	 impede	 access	 to	
those	vital	research	resources	by	potential	rivals.4	 	Nevertheless,	not	very	long	ago	many	
writers	 in	 the	 business	 press,	 academic	 economists,	 lawyers,	 and	 government	 policy‐
makers	saw	this		matter	very	differently	–	and	some	still	do	so	today.	
	The	 centrality	 of	 information	 technologies	 and	 information	 goods	 in	 the	
phenomena	 that	 were	 associated	 with	 the	 “New	 Economy”	 euphoria	 and	 its	 disruptive	
                                                 
3	On	this	and	related	challenges	for	integrating	practical,	mutually	self‐reinforcing	economic	policy	measures	










53;	 and	 2008)	 examine	 these	 obstacles	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 hopes	 for	 a	 new	 age	 of	 global	 collaboration	
brought	 about	 by	 e‐Science	 and	 Grid	 computing	 infrastructures,	 and	 propose	 a	 variety	 of	 ameliorative	
institutional	innovations.		




institutional	 sequelae	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 Millennium	 suggested	 that	 the	 world	 had	 left	
behind	the	epoch	of	material	capitalism;	 that	we	had	moved	 into	on	a	new	and	different	
stage	–	that	of	“Intellectual	Capitalism”,	which	it	should	be	the	purpose	of	public	policies	to	
perfect,	 as	 it	 has	 sought	 to	 perfect	 the	 workings	 of	 markets	 for	 ordinary	 commodities.		
Accordingly,	on	this	new	view,	the	way	forward	called	for	assuring	the	continued	vitality	of	
the	market	system	in	the	domain	of	 information	and	data.	Moreover,	 it	was	seen	that	 for	
that	 tasks,	 new	 technical	 and	 institutional	 tools	 were	 available:	 digital	 information	





drawing	 “rents	 from	 their	 holdings	 of	 patents	 and	 copyrights,	 it	 also	 expanded	 the	
opportunities	 for	 the	 entry	 of	 new	 rivals	 –	 unexpectedly	 armed	with	market‐disrupting	
technological	innovations.	
	Too	much	responsibility	for	the	shifted	balance	of	science	and	technology	policy	‐‐	
from	 state	 patronage	 and	 towards	 reliance	 on	 property	 rights	 monopolies,	 should	 not	
however	 be	 laid	 at	 the	 door	 of	 the	 digital	 information	 revolution.	 The	 broader,	 and	
increasingly	 perceptible	 swing	 of	 the	 policy	 pendulum	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 and	 several	 of	 the	
leading	economically	and	scientifically	advanced	EU	member	states,	received	impetus	and	
gained	 momentum	 from	 the	 contemporaneous	 intensification	 of	 global	 economic	
competition,	 as	 well	 as	 from	 the	 straightened	 fiscal	 conditions	 under	 which	 the	
governments	of	 those	nations	were	operating	 throughout	much	of	 the	decade	preceding	
1989.		The	latter	developments	had	emerged	not	from	any	coherent	set	of	policy	decisions,	
but	 rather	 from	 a	 diverse	 multiplicity	 of	 ad	 hoc	 reactions	 to	 events,	 	 incremental	
alterations	 of	 public	 sector	 budget	 priorities,	 realignments	 of	 government	 agency	 and	
institutional	missions,	 as	well	 as	 legislative	 and	 judicial	 extensions	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 legal	
protections	afforded	to	owners	of	intellectual	property	rights.5		
                                                 
5	Competition	among	leaders	and	followers	in	international	markets	for	high‐tech	manufactures,	combined	













localizing	 the	 relentless	 transformation	 of	 implicit	 and	 unexpressed	 human	 knowledge	
into	 explicit	 codified	 information,	 which	 permits	 its	 virtually	 costless	 reproduction,	
communication	and	those	ubiquitous	“spill‐overs”	that	interfere	with	the	complete	private	
appropriation	of	wealth	and	power	from	science.6		





depends	 upon	 its	 sustained	 vigor	 towards	 the	 truly	 darker	 past	 from	 which	 western	
European	societies	quite	fortuitously	managed	to	escape	in	the	seventeenth	century.	
The	 modus	 of	 that	 liberation	 –	 one	 could	 say	 the	 dawning	 of	 an	 “enlightened”	
collective	 pursuit	 of	 scientific	 knowledge”	 ‐‐	 was	 provided	 by	 the	 inter‐twinning	 of	
intellectual	and	institutional	transformations	that	first	coupled	the	Scientific	Revolution	of	
that	 era	 with	 the	 growing	 adherence	 to	 new	 attitudes	 and	 practices	 regarding	 the	
disclosure	 of	 “Nature’s	 Secrets.”	 	 This	 emergent	 ethos	 subsequently	 reinforced	 the	
institutionalization	and	stabilization	of	public	patronage	of	researchers	in	the	“Republic	of	
Science.”7	 	It	then	gave	rise	to	a	new,	institutionalized	system	of	fruitful	interactions	with	
proprietary,	 market‐oriented	 R&D	 activities	 that	 were	 also	 moving	 away	 from	
                                                 
6	See	Cowan,	David	and	Foray	 (2000)	 for	a	 critique	of	 this	 strain	 that	appeared	 in	writings	on	 “tacitness”,	
“sticky	data”	 and	 	 science	 and	 technology	policy	during	 the	 latter	half	 of	 the	1990’s,	 and	 a	 quite	 different	
conceptual	framework	for	treating	the	subject.		
7	 Modern	 use	 of	 the	 phrase	 “Republic	 of	 Science”	 by	 Michael	 Polanyi	 (1962)	 transparently	 evoked	 the	
broader	 humanist	 metaphor	 of	 a	 self‐governing,	 trans‐national	 intellectual	 polity	 whose	 transactions	
conducted	by	civil	discourse	in	the	universal	language:	the	respublica	literari.	The	“self‐governing”	nature	of	
(open)	 scientific	 communities	 was	 first	 examined	 by	 Polanyi	 (1942),	 contemporaneously	 with	 Merton’s	
(1942)	 essay	 on	 the	 normative	 structure	 of	 science.	 	 On	 roots	 of	 the	 18th	 century	 Enlightenment	 in	 the	




breed	 of	 university‐trained	 	 physicians	 ‐‐many	 of	 whom	 figured	 in	 the	 ranks	 of	 the	 leading	 European	
scientists	of	that	epoch.			







open	 science	 and	 the	 subsequent	 institutionalization	 of	 its	 practices	 is	 a	 useful	 step	
towards	 fuller	 appreciation	 of	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 constellation	 of	 differentiated	
institutions	 supporting	and	shaping	 the	 conduct	of	 scientific	 and	 technical	 research	 is	 in	
reality	a	quite	fragile	cultural	construct.		As	I	shall	try	to	indicate	within	the	brief	compass	
of	 this	 paper,	 we	 are	 dealing	 with	 the	 legacy	 of	 an	 extended,	 intricate	 and	 contingent	
historical	process	that	cannot	be	assumed	to	have	been	produced	by	some	underlying	self‐
balancing,	and	auto‐regenerative	system	–	one	that	that	has	arisen	purely	 in	response	to	
the	 imperatives	 of	 modern	 scientific	 technique	 and	 therefore	 requires	 neither	 social	
maintenance	nor	political	protections.	
True,	as	is	the	case	with	many	social	structures,	the	institutional	infrastructures	of	
‘‘open	 science’’	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 possess	 a	measure	 of	 plasticity.	 But	 elasticity	 has	 limits.	
Consequently,	along	with	other	delicate	pieces	of	(social)	machinery,	a	substantial	measure	
of	 caution	 and	 patience	 in	 seeking	 to	 first	 thoroughly	 understand	 the	 manner	 of	 its	
construction	and	its	present	workings	would	seem	the	minimum	that	should	be	asked	of	
those	 having	 the	 power	 to	 tinker	 with	 this	 important	 institutional	 component	 of	




Examining	the	strands	of	 internal	 intellectual	development	 fused	 into	“mechanical			
philosophy”,	and	the	nexus	of	“external”	economic,	social	and	political	forces	that	shaped	
the	early	practices	of	open	science	and	its	connections	with	the	Scientific	Revolution	of	the	
seventeenth	 century,	 leads	 one	 to	 appreciate	 the	 emergence	 of	 this	 complex	 of	
institutionalized	behaviors	 in	western	Europe	as	an	extraordinary	piece	of	 cultural	good	
fortune.	Perhaps	that	perception	will	serve	to	heighten	awareness	of	the	potentialities	of	
unintended	 and	 unwanted	 consequences	 that	 are	 latent	 in	 efforts	 to	 hastily	 re‐orient	
complex	and	venerable	social	institutions	in	order	make	them	serve	new	purposes	that	are	
                                                 
8	 On	 the	 historical	 origins	 of	 patent	 rights	 and	 the	 patent	 system’s	 early	 institutional	 evolution,	 see	 Hill	
(1924),	David	(1993,	1994)	and	references	therein.		







to	 turn	away	 from	their	preoccupations	with	probing	resource	allocation	mechanisms	 in	
the	interior	of	the	“black	box	of	technology”	–	for	at	least	long	enough	to	develop	a	clearer	
view	 of	 what	 goes	 on	 inside	 the	 other	 major	 component	 of	 modern	 research	 and	
innovations	systems,	the	still	comparatively	unexamined	“black	box	of	science.”	Although	
the	 open	 science	 system	 has	 begun	 to	 be	 systematically	 explored	 during	 the	 past	 two	
decades	 using	 the	 tools	 of	 economic	 analysis,9	 far	more	 remains	 known	 and	understood	
about	 the	 intellectual	property	protection	mechanisms	 that	enable	private	appropriation	
of	 research	 benefits,	 and	 the	 evolving	 institutional	 structures	 affecting	 proprietary	 R&D	
resource	allocation.		
The	 desirability	 of	 closing	 that	 particular	 lacuna	 in	 the	 economics	 and	 economic	
history	 literatures	has	 been	 as	 evident	 to	 those	who	have	perceived	 it	within	 a	 broader	
concern	 with	 the	 economics	 of	 institutions,	 and	 also	 to	 philosophers,	 sociologists	 and	
historians	who	have	approached	from	the	perspectives	of	science	and	technology	studies.	
Consequently,	 a	 growing	 company	 of	 economic	 and	 technological	 historians,	 along	with	
economists	of	an	historical	persuasion,	have	begun	to	turn	their	attention	to	studying	the	
scientific	 foundations	 of	 the	modern	 “knowledge	 economy.”10	 	 Nevertheless,	 this	 rapidly	
growing	 literature	 continues	 to	 be	 preoccupied	 (understandably	 enough)	 with	 pressing	
contemporary	questions	about	the	performance	of	these	 institutions	and	the	people	who	
work	within	them.	It	rarely	pauses	to	ask	how	the	modern	world	came	to	have	two	quite	
different	and	 in	 some	respects	antithetical	modes	of	organizing	and	allocating	 resources	
for	 the	 pursuit	 of	 reliable	 knowledge.	 The	 answer	 proposed	 in	 these	 pages	 is,	 then,	 a	
                                                 
9	On	 the	 “new	economics	of	 science”	program	 to	 redress	 this	 comparative	neglect	 through	research	 in	 the	
microeconomics	 of	 resource	 allocation	within	 publicly	 supported	 science,	 see	Dasgupta	 and	 David	 (1987,	
1994),	 David	 (1994b,	 1998,	 2002	 2003),	 David,	 Mowery,	 Steinmueller	 (1992),	 and	 surveys	 by	 Diamond	
(1996),	Stephan	(1996),	and	David,	Foray	and	Steinmueller	(1999),	den	Besten,	David	and	Schroeder	(2010).	
Note	 should	 be	 taken	 of	 the	 harvest	 of	 interesting	 and	 ingenious	 quantitative	 studies	 emerging	 from	 a	
younger	generation	of	economists,	 including	Arora,	David	and	Gambardella	 (1998),	Geuna	(1999),	Carayol	
(2003,	2007),	Carayol	and	Dalle	 (2000,	2007).	On	 the	problematic	aspects	of	 the	 interactions	between	the	
regime	of	intellectual	property	rights	protections	and	academic	science,	see	also	the	quantitative	studies	by	
Walsh,	Arora	 and	Cohen	 (2003),	Murray	 (2006,	 2010),	Murray	 and	 Stern	 (2007),	 Gans,	Murray	 and	Stern	
(2010),	Williams	(2012).			
10	In	addition	to	the	works	cited	below	as	specifically	germane	to	the	institutional	history	on	which	this	paper	
focuses,	 see	 the	 variety	 of	 topics	 addressed,	 e.g.	 by	 Lécuyer	 (1998),	 Lenoir	 (1998),	 and	 the	 broader,	 less	
institutionally	specific	treatments	available	to	be	found	in	Headrick	(2000),	Mokyr	(2002:Ch.2;	2009:Chs.2‐
3),	and	Foray	(2004).	









character,	 and	 its	 associated	 ethos	 of	 cooperative	 inquiry	 and	 free	 sharing	 of	 research	
findings	that	were	famously	articulated	by	Robert	K.	Merton.11	 	The	institutional	features	
of	prime	interest	here	are	those	that	most	sharply	distinguish	the	sphere	of	“open	science”	
(supported	 by	 public	 funding	 and	 the	 patronage	 of	 private	 foundations)	 from	 both	 the	
organized	 conduct	 of	 scientific	 research	 under	 commercially‐oriented	 proprietary	 rules	
regarding	data	and	 information,	and	 the	production	and	procurement	of	defense‐related	




its	 expression	 and	 institutionalization	 in	 the	practice	 of	 open	 science	 is	 a	 comparatively	
recent	innovation,	one	that	began	to	take	recognizable	form	in	European	toward	the	close	
of	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 and	 emerged	 clearly	 during	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 seventeenth	
century.12	 This	 development	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 vital	 and	 distinctive	 aspect	 of	 the	
Scientific	 Revolution	 of	 that	 era,	 from	 which	 there	 crystallized	 a	 new	 set	 of	 social	
conventions,	 incentive	structures,	 and	 institutional	mechanisms	 that	 reinforced	scientific	
researchers'	 commitments	 to	 rapid	 disclosure	 and	 wider	 dissemination	 of	 their	 new	
discoveries	and	inventions.	
	 The	 epistemological	 transformation	 effected	 by	 the	 fusion	 of	 medieval	
experimentalism	 with	 Renaissance	 mathematics	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 an	 enormous	
                                                 
11	 Merton	 (1973),	 Chs.	 11,	 12	 reprinted	 from	 Merton	 (1938/1970),	 and	 Ch.	 13,	 reprinted	 from	 Merton	
(1942);	also,	Merton	(1996:	Chs.	20‐24,	Ben‐David	(1991:	esp.	Parts	IV	and	VI).	See	Ziman	(1994,	p.	177)	for	
the	 suggested	 mnemonic	 device	 for	 recalling	 the	 principal	 Mertonian	 norms:	 	 CUDOS	 ‐‐	 Communalism,	
Universalism,		Dis‐interestedness,	Objectivity,		Scepticism.				
12	 As	 close	 to	 the	 present	 as	 that	 is,	 considered	 in	 historical	 time,	 it	 dates	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 idea	 of	
science	 as	 a	 shared,	 public	 endeavour	 as	 having	 occurred	 well	 more	 than	 a	 half	 ‐century	 before	 the	
establishment	in	Paris	and	London	during	the	1660s	of	scientific	societies	as	formal	institutions	under	royal	
patronage.	 	 This	 chronological	 shift	 represents	 the	 consensus	 of	 subsequent	 historical	 research	 (esp.	 that	
which,	following	McClellan	(1985),	which	has	done	much	to	correct	the	misleading	impressions	conveyed	by	
Ornstein	 (1928)	 and	 Brown	 (1934)	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 instrumental	 role	 that	 these	 early	 state‐sponsored	
scientific	 societies	 had	 played	 in	 creating	 the	 new	 ethos	 of	 science	 as	 the	 cooperative	 pursuit	 of	 shared	
knowledge.		Surprisingly,	however,	strong	echoes	of	that	the	latter	view	still	are	found	in	modern	surveys	of	
the	history	of	science,	e.g.,	Pyenson	and	Sheets‐Pyenson	(1999:	Ch.	3	–	on	“Sharing”).						




literature	 that	 focuses	 on	 tracing	 the	 intellectual	 foundations	 upon	 which	 those	 late	
sixteenth	 and	 early	 seventeenth	 century	 developments	 rested.	 Figure	 1	 reprises	 the	
familiar	 main	 lines	 of	 continuity	 in	 a	 schematic	 outline	 of	 the	 Scientific	 Revolution’s	
antecedent	 intellectual	 sources.6	 	But,	 the	 late	 sixteenth	 and	 early	 seventeenth	 centuries	
also	witnessed	a	transition	from	the	previously	dominant	ethos	of	secrecy	in	the	pursuit	of	
Nature’s	 Secrets,	 which	 gave	 way	 to	 a	 new	 set	 of	 norms,	 incentives	 and	 organizational	
structures.	 These	 institutional	 transformations	 reinforced	 scientific	 researchers’	






seem	 to	 deserve,	 especially	 in	 view	 of	 the	 complementarities	 and	 tensions	 that	 are	
recognized	to	be	present	today	in	relations	between	the	regimes	of	'open'	and	'proprietary'	
science.	 Even	 superficial	 reference	 to	 the	 antecedent	 intellectual	 orientation	 and	 social	
organization	 of	 scientific	 research	 in	 the	 West	 suggests	 the	 utter	 improbability	 of	 the	
historical	bifurcation	that	this	involved.	For,	it	saw	emerge	alongside	and	in	some	sense	in	
competition	 with	 the	 older,	 secretive	 search	 for	 ‘Nature's	 Secrets,’	 a	 new	 and	 quite	
antithetical	mode	 of	 conducting	 'the	 hunt	 for	 knowledge.'	 Virtually	 all	 of	 the	 intellectual	
traditions	 and	material	 conditions	 in	 the	medieval	West	 inveighed	 against	 ‘openness’	 of	
inquiry	and	public	disclosure	of	discoveries	about	the	natural	order	of	the	world,	let	alone	
the	heavens.	Medieval	experimental	science	was	shaped	by	a	political	and	religious	outlook	
that	 encouraged	 withholding	 from	 the	 "vulgar	 multitude”	 arcane	 knowledge	 that	 might	
bring	power	over	material	things.	The	imperative	of	secrecy	was	particularly	strong	in	the	
medieval	and	Renaissance	traditions	of	Alchemy,	where,	 indeed,	 it	persisted	side‐by‐side	
with	 the	 emergent	 institutions	 of	 open	 science	 throughout	 the	 17th	 and	 into	 the	 18th	
century13.	 Social	 and	 economic	 regulations	 during	 the	 Middle	 Ages,	 along	 with	 the	
relatively	 primitive	 and	 costly	 technologies	 available	 for	 scientific	 communications,	 also	
reinforced	the	moral	and	philosophical	considerations	arrayed	against	open	disclosure	of	
discovered	 secrets.	 Economic	 rent‐seeking	 worked	 in	 the	 same	 direction:	 knowledge	 of	
                                                 
13	 See	 David	 (2008:	 pp.	 9‐11,	 23‐24)	 for	 discussion	 of	 Thorndike	 (1950:vol.	 II),	 Eamon	 (1985,	 1994)	 on	
medieval	arcane	knowledge	and	experimental	science;	Vickers	(1984)	on	Renaissance	alchemy;	and	Dobbs	
(1975),	 Westfall	 (1980),	 Feingold	 (1984)	 and	 Figala	 and	 Petzold	 (1993)	 and	 the	 “chemico‐alchemical	
practices	that	deeply	engaged	leading	early	modern	scientists,	including	Robert	Boyle	and	Isaac	Newton.					






closely	 held	 technological	 recipes,	 even	 when	 they	 were	 not	 compelled	 by	 guild	
restrictions	to	preserve	the	'mysteries'	of	the	industrial	arts.14		
	 Why	then,	out	of	such	a	background	of	secrecy	and	obfuscation,	should	there	have	
emerged	 a	quite	 distinctive	 community	 of	 inquiry	 into	 the	 nature	of	 the	physical	world,	
holding	different	norms	regarding	disclosure,	and	being	governed	by	a	distinctive	reward	
system	based	upon	priority	of	discovery?	Why	so?	The	question	is	striking	especially	in	the	
modern	 context,	 where	 one	 may	 see	 that	 there	 is	 little	 if	 any	 difference	 between	 the	
methods	 of	 (scientific)	 inquiry	 used	 by	 university	 scientists	 working	 under	 the	
institutional	norms	of	open	science,	and	the	procedures	that	they	(or	others	with	the	same	
academic	 training)	 employ	 in	 the	 setting	 of	 a	 corporate	 R&D	 laboratory?	 Can	 the	 social	
organization	 of	 open	 science	 then	 be	 simply	 an	 epiphenomenon	 of	 the	 profound	
philosophical	and	religious	re‐orientations	that	have	been	presented	as	underpinning	the	
Scientific	Revolution,	if	not	the	epistemological	transformation	that	latter	had	wrought?	Or,	
should	 the	 intellectual	 achievements	 of	 that	 epoch	 instead	 be	 read	 as	 consequences	 of	
what	 might	 be	 called	 the	 "Open	 Science	 Revolution”?	 To	 state	 the	 problem	 more	
synthetically,	is	it	not	plausible	that	these	two	discontinuities	–	the	one	taking	place	in	the	
social	 organization	 of	 scientific	 inquiry	 and	 the	 other	 transforming	 its	 intellectual	
organization	–	were	interdependent,	and	entangled	with	each	other	 in	ways	that	need	to	
be	more	thoroughly	understood?	
	 A	 start	 towards	answering	 this	question	 is	provided	by	 considering	 the	economic	
logic	of	the	organization	of	knowledge‐producing	activities,	for,	it	is	possible	in	such	terms	
to	 give	 a	 complete	 functionalist	 account	 of	 the	 institutional	 complex	 that	 characterizes	
modern	science.	In	brief,	the	norm	of	'openness'	is	'incentive	compatible'	with	a	collegiate	
reputational	reward	system	based	upon	accepted	claims	to	priority;	and	it	is	conducive	to	
individual	 strategy	 choices	 whose	 collective	 congruence	 reduces	 excess	 duplication	 of	
research	efforts,	and	enlarges	the	domain	of	informational	complementarities.	This	brings	
socially	beneficial	 ‘spill‐overs’	among	research	programs,	and	abets	rapid	replication	and	
swift	 validation	 of	 novel	 discoveries.	 The	advantages	 of	 treating	 new	 findings	 as	 "public	
                                                 
14	On	secrecy	about	maps	relating	geographical	discoveries	and	new	trade	routes,	and	craft‐guild	“mysteries”	
and	 anti‐competitive	 practices	 restricting	 the	 dissemination	 of	 technical	 knowledge,	 see	 the	 discussion	 in	
David	 (2008)	based	on	Thrupp	 (1942,	 1963),	Unwin	 (1964),	 Long	 (1991),	Hilaire‐Pérez	 (1991,	 and	2000:		
esp.	 pp.	 136‐142).	 	 See	 also	 the	 critique	 by	 Ogilvie	 (2004)	 of	 recent	 efforts	 to	 re‐cast	 the	 early	 modern	
European	craft‐guilds	in	the	role	of	an	efficient	pro‐innovation	agency.		








	 The	 preceding	 rationale	 provides	 important	 explanatory	 insights	 regarding	 the	
survival	of	the	constellation	of	open	science	norms	and	institutions	in	most	of	the	modern,	
scientifically	 and	 technologically	 advanced	 economies.	 It	 does	 so	 by	 highlighting	 the	




“stock”	 of	 reliable	 knowledge.	 This	 juxtaposition	 of	 complementary	 functions	 suggests	 a	
logical	 basis	 for	 the	 existence	 and	 perpetuation	 of	 institutional	 and	 cultural	 separations	
between	 two	 normatively	 differentiated	 communities	 of	 research	 practice:	 the	 open	
'Republic	 of	 Science’	 and	 the	 proprietary	 'Realm	 of	 Technology’. This	 juxtaposition	
suggests	 a	 logical	 basis	 for	 the	 existence	 and	 perpetuation	 of	 institutional	 and	 cultural	
separations	between	two	normatively	differentiated	communities	of	research	practice,	the	
open	 'Republic	of	Science’	and	the	proprietary	 'Realm	of	Technology’:	 the	two	distinctive	
organizational	 regimes	 serve	 not	 only	 different,	 but	 potentially	 complementary	 societal	
purposes.		
	 Yet,	 the	 “logical	 origins”	 style	 of	 explanation	 for	 the	 co‐existing	 institutions	 of	
modern	 science	 and	 technological	 development	 entirely	 abstracts	 from	 (which	 is	 to	 say,	
ignores)	 the	 specific	 social	 and	 economic	 circumstances	 of	 their	 emergence	 and	 ensuing	
historical	 evolution.	 	 Such	 a	 rationale	 would	 seem	 to	 presuppose,	 at	 best,	 a	 form	 of	
'creationist'	 fiction	 –	 namely	 that	 these	 arrangements	were	 instituted	 ab	 initio	 by	 some	
external	 agency,	 such	 as	 an	 informed	 and	 benevolent	 political	 authority	 endowed	 with	
fiscal	powers.	Objections	to	this	particular	fiction	(on	the	evidentiary	grounds	that	at	the	
moment	of	 institutional	genesis	no	such	agency	was	present)	calls	 for	an	explicit	 inquiry	
into	the	 'historical	origins'	of	 the	 institutions	of	open	science,	since	these	remain	outside	
the	 set	 of	 'logical	 origins"	 that	 one	 arrives	 at	 by	 simply	 considering	 the	 present‐day	
functional	value	of	an	already	extant,	cooperative	mode	of	scientific	research.		
	
                                                 
15	For	 further	 exposition,	 see	Dasgupta	and	David	 (1987,	1994),	David	 (2003),	 and	David,	den	Besten	and	
Schroeder	(2010).	





	 Rather	 than	 accepting	 an	 essentially	 “idealist”	 approach	 to	 the	 problem,	 which	
would	construe	the	reorganization	of	scientific	activities	in	early	modern	Europe	as	having	
somehow	 derived	 automatically	 from	 the	 intellectual	 changes	 represented	 by	 the	 new	
style	of	 ‘scientific’	activity,	I	have	proposed	that	the	historical	emergence	of	the	norms	of	
disclosure	and	demonstration,	 and	 the	 rise	of	 “cooperative	 rivalries”	 in	 the	 revelation	of	
new	knowledge,	 had	 independent	 and	 antecedent	 roots.16	 	 These	 are	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	
social,	material	and	institutional	contexts	in	which	the	new	breed	of	scientists	of	that	era	
were	working.	My	central	thesis	here	is	that	the	formation	of	a	distinctive	research	culture	
of	 open	 science	was	 first	made	 possible,	 and,	 indeed,	was	 positively	 encouraged	 by	 the	
system	 of	 aristocratic	 patronage	 in	 an	 era	 when	 kings	 and	 nobles	 (both	 lay	 and	
ecclesiastical)	were	 immediately	concerned	with	the	"ornamental"	benefits	 to	be	derived	
by	their	sponsorship	of	philosophers	and	savants	of	great	renown.17		
		 My	 argument	 in	 support	 of	 this	 interpretation	 is	 that	 the	 economic	 logic	 of	 the	
patronage	system	 in	post‐Renaissance	Europe	 induced	 the	emergence	and	promoted	 the	
institutionalization	 of	 reputation‐building	 proceedings,	 all	 of	 which	 turned	 upon	 the	
revelation	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 and	 special	 “expertise”	 among	 extended	 reference	
groups	 that	 included	 “peer‐experts.”	 Specifically,	 the	 core	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 the	 new	
departures	 from	 the	 ancient	 tradition	 of	 “keeping	 nature’s	 secrets”	 were	 a	 functional	
response	 to	 heightened	 asymmetric	 information	 problems	 that	 had	 been	 posed	 for	 the	
Renaissance	 system	 of	 court‐patronage	 of	 the	 arts	 and	 sciences.	 The	 pre‐existing	
informational	 asymmetries	 between	 noble	 patrons	 and	 their	 savants‐clients	 had	 been	
markedly	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 claims	 of	 Renaissance	 mathematicians	 and	 the	 increasing	
practical	 reliance	 upon	 new	 mathematical	 techniques	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 “contexts	 of	
application.”	 Disclosure	 of	 both	 new	 knowledge	 and	 reliable	 techniques	 for	 solving	





and	 preservation	 of	 nature's	 secrets	 within	 an	 elect	 brotherhoods	 of	 scientists,	 and	 towards	 a	 new	
(Baconian)		program	of	systematic	pursuit	and	full	disclosure	of	new	discoveries	and	inventions.	See	David	




208)	 in	a	brief	comment	on	Feingold’s	 (1984:	Ch.	VI)	emphatic	contrast	between	the	very	 few	and	 limited	
places	that	the	mathematicians	of	that	era	were	able	to	find	within	Europe’s	universities,	on	the	one	hand,	
and,	 on	 the	other,	 the	employments	 that	were	made	available	 to	 them	as	 clients	and	 tutors	 in	aristocratic	
households.	The	mathematicians	will	be	seen	to	figure	importantly	in	the	story	told	here.			





challenges	 and	 competitions	 among	 the	 mathematically	 adept	 provided	 a	 convenient	
vehicle	 for	 building	 reputational	 renown.	 	 The	 mechanisms	 that	 eventually	 would	 be	
brought	into	service	to	meet	that	need	spanned	the	range	from	the	participation	would‐be	
savants	 in	 informal	networks	of	 correspondence,	 to	public	 challenges	and	contests,	open	
demonstrations,	 and	 exhibitions	 and	 the	 certification	 of	 individuals	 by	 co‐optation	 and	
election	to	"learned	societies.”	




been	 necessary	 even	 though	 they	 did	 not	 have	 a	 “precipitating”	 influence.	 Moreover,	




but	 who	 find	 –	 or	 suppose	 –	 that	 their	 distinctive	 purposes	 will	 be	 served	 by	 making	
common	 cause	 with	 one	 another	 at	 least	 for	 the	 moment.	 	 The	 kernel	 of	 the	 present	
argument,	however,	is		focused	upon	the	configuration	of	precipitating	causes,	factors	that	
in	themselves	may	not	have	been	sufficient	to	account	for	the	changes,	but	whose	addition	
to	 other,	 pre‐existing	 (background)	 conditions	 enables	 us	 to	 understand	 why	 these	
institutional	changes	occurred	when	and	where	they	did,	and	not	earlier	or	elsewhere.	18	
	 Nevertheless,	 there	were	concurrent	developments	 that,	while	not	playing	central	
explanatory	 roles,	 should	 be	 briefly	 recognized	 as	 factors	 facilitating	 or	 abetting	 more	
open	 discourse	 among	 those	 seeking	 to	 uncover	 Nature’s	 Secrets,	 and	 the	wider	 public	
circulation	of	information	about	their	discoveries	and	inventions.	Two	set	among	these	are	






other	 than	 those	 in	 Western	 Europe.	 Similarly,	 Arrow’s	 (2008)	 characteristically	 thought‐provoking	
“Comment”	on	David	(2008)	–	points	to	the	exemplary	sharing	of	knowledge	by	leading	mathematicians	in	
ancient	 Greece,	 and	 remarks	 that	 humans	 who	 possess	 highly	 specialized	 forms	 of	 expertise	 (such	 as	
mathematics)	 appear	 in	 an	 earlier	 time	 to	 have	 been	motivated	 intrinsically	 by	 “the	 additional	 desires	 to	








assigned	auxiliary	parts	 in	 the	present	argument,	 and	 therefore	appear	on	either	 side	of	
the	core	structure	in	the	schematic,	summary	representation	provided	by	Figure	2.		On	the	
Figure’s	 left	 side,	 the	prior	development	of	 the	printing	 and	publishing	 trades,	 following	
Gutenberg’s	 innovations	 in	 the	 mid‐fifteenth	 century,	 is	 recognized	 as	 a	 “background”	





	 On	 the	 right‐hand	 side	 of	 the	Figure	 one	 finds	 acknowledgement	 that	 toward	 the	
close	of	sixteenth	century	 the	 flowering	of	empiricism	called	 for	open	demonstrations	of	
experimental	 results,	 as	well	 as	 displays	 of	 novel	 natural	 objects	 and	 artefacts;	 that	 this	
need	 could	be	 accommodated	by	presentations	before	 gatherings	 that	 included	not	 only	
“scientific	 peers”	 but,	 importantly,	 members	 of	 local	 aristocratic	 elites,	 whose	 presence	
and	 patronage	 furnished	 social	 legitimacy	 and	 a	 measure	 of	 material	 support	 for	 the	
proceedings	of	the	early	“scientific	academies,	such	as	.”19		 	
	 	Patronage	 was	 an	 old	 system	 in	 the	 17th	 century,	 and	 the	 sponsorship	 of	
intellectuals	 was	 a	 long‐standing	 prerogative	 and	 responsibility	 of	 Europe's	 social	 and	
political	elites.20		It	is	necessary,	therefore,	to	explain	why	something	new	appeared	on	the	
scene;	 why	 some	 of	 the	 conventions	 and	 norms	 now	 associated	with	 open	 science	 –	 in	
particular,	 the	 reliance	 upon	peer	 appraisal	 and	 collective	 evaluation	 expressed	 through	
the	 formation	 of	 professional	 reputations	 –	 were	 induced	 in	 primitive	 form	 at	 this	
particular	 juncture	 in	history.	 The	 key	propositions	 for	 this	 part	 of	my	 argument	 derive	
from	first	considering	the	economics	of	patronage	in	general,	and	then	noticing	the	specific	
implications	 of	 the	 newly	 arising	 problems	 of	 "principal‐agent	 contracting"	 that	 were	
created	 by	 the	 encounter	 of	 the	 late	 Renaissance	 patronage	 system	 with	 the	 new	
                                                 
19	 Space	 is	 not	 available	 here	 to	 summarize	 extensive	 historical	 literature	 on	 the	 development	 and	
significance	of	the	two	sets	of	ancillary	conditions	that	are	identified	in	Figure	2,	and	considered	in	in	some	









(mathematical)	 form	 of	 natural	 philosophy	 practised	 by	 Galileo,	 Kepler	 and	 their	
contemporaries.21	
		 	Aristocratic	 patronage	 systems	 have	 reflected	 two	 kinds	 of	 motivation:	 the	
utilitarian	and	the	ornamental.	Most	political	elites,	 in	addition	to	recognizing	some	need	
in	their	domain	for	men	capable	of	producing	new	ideas	and	inventions	to	solve	mundane	
problems	 connected	 with	 warfare	 and	 security,	 land	 reclamation,	 food	 production,	
transport	 facilities,	 and	 so	 forth,	 also	 have	 sought	 to	 enlist	 the	 services	 of	 those	 who	
professed	an	ability	to	reveal	the	secrets	of	Nature,	and	of	Destiny.	Kings	and	princes,	and	
lesser	nobles	too	sought	to	surround	themselves	with	creative	talents	whose	achievements	
would	enhance	not	only	 their	 self‐esteem,	but	 also	 their	public	 image	–	 those	 aspects	of	
grandeur	 and	 ostentatious	 display	 that	 might	 serve	 to	 reinforce	 their	 claims	 to	 rightful	
authority.	 Thus,	 poets,	 artists,	musicians,	 chroniclers,	 architects,	 instrument‐makers	 and	
natural	 philosophers	 found	 employment	 in	 aristocratic	 courts,	 both	 because	 their	 skills	
might	serve	the	pleasures	of	the	court,	and	because	their	presence	"made	a	statement"	in	
the	competition	among	nobles	for	prestige.	These	dyadic	patron‐client	relationships,	which	
offered	 the	 latter	 material	 and	 political	 support	 in	 exchange	 for	 service,	 were	 often	
precarious,	uncomfortably	subject	to	aristocratic	whims	and	pleasures,	and	to	the	abrupt	
termination	 that	would	 ensue	 on	 the	 disgrace	 or	 demise	 of	 a	 patron.	 Nonetheless,	 they	
existed	 in	 this	 era	 as	 part	 of	 a	 well‐articulated	 system	 characterized	 by	 elaborate	
conventions	and	rituals	 that	provided	calculable	career	paths	 for	men	of	 intellectual	and	
artistic	talents.22		
	 Those	motives	for	entering	into	a	patron's	role	that	reduce	to	symbolic	acts	of	self‐
aggrandizement	 are	 here	 subsumed	 under	 the	 heading	 "ornamental."	 Such	 reasons,	
however,	should	be	understood	to	have	been	no	less	instrumental	in	their	nature	and	roots	
than	 were	 the	 utilitarian	 considerations	 for	 the	 patronage	 of	 intellectuals.	 The	 public	
display	of	"magnificence,”	 in	which	art	and	power	had	become	allied,	was	a	stock	item	in	
                                                 
21	See	Moran	(1991)	for	extensive	discussion	of	the	patronage	of	science	and	medicine	in	the	court	of	Prince	
Henry	of	Wales	 (d.1612)	at	Richmond	Palace,	 the	Court	of	Rudolph	 II	 and	 the	Habsburg	circle	 in	 the	mid‐
seventeenth	 century,	 the	 Munich	 Court	 of	 Ferdinand	 Maria,	 the	 Elector	 of	 Bavaria	 (r.	 1654‐1679),	 and	
elsewhere	in	Europe.	Galileo’s	involvement	in	the	system	of	court	patronage	in	Italy	and	his	communications	
during	1610	with	Kepler,	then	in	the	service	of	Emperor	Rudolph	II	in	Prague,	are	treated	in	great	detail	by	
Biagioli	 (1993).	On	Kepler’s	 services	 for	 less	 august	patrons	prior	 to	 accepting	Rudolph’s	 II	 invitation,	 see	
Thoren	 (1990:Ch.	 12)	 and	 David	 (2008,	 pp.32‐36.)	 The	 analogous	 situations	 of	 many	 notable	 scientific	
figures	in	eighteenth	century	Europe	also	should	be	mentioned,	e.g.,	as	in	Mokyr	(1990:	pp.	73,	84,	169)	on	
Leibnitz,	Torriceli	and	Borelli,	respectively.		
22	 See	 esp.	 Biagioli	 (1990,	 1993)	 and	Moran	 (1991)	 for	 the	 sixteenth	 and	 seventeenth	 century	 patronage	
system’s	elaborate	social	conventions	and	rituals.	




the	 repertoire	 of	 Renaissance	 statecraft.	 This	 is	 significant,	 because	 inventions	 and	
discoveries	 that	met	utilitarian	needs	 in	 some	 instances	would	have	 to	 be	 kept	 secret	 if	
they	were	to	be	most	useful,	whereas	it	is	in	the	nature	of	the	ornamental	motive	that	its	






altogether	 a	 good	 thing;	 it	 was	 far	 better	 if	 such	 clients	 were	 personages	 of	 greater	
accomplishments	 and	 renown	 than	 those	who	happened	 to	 be	 in	 the	 service	 of	 a	 rival's	
court.	 The	 pressure	 on	 Europe's	 ruling	 families	 to	 have	 intellectuals	 of	 recognized	
eminence	 in	their	service	was	thus	exacerbated	by	the	existence	of	rival	rulers	and	their	
courts,	 and	 so	 lent	 additional	 strength	 to	 the	ornamental	motives	 for	 their	patronage	 of	
such	clients.	
	 Into	 this	 setting	a	new	element	had	been	 interjected	during	 the	16th	century:	 the	
more	extensive	and	rigorous	use	of	mathematical	methods	formed	an	important	aspect	of	
the	work	of	the	new	breed	of	natural	philosophers.24	But,	one	surely	unintended	side‐effect	
of	 this	 intellectual	 advance	was	 to	 render	 the	 basis	 of	 the	mathematically	 sophisticated	
savants'	claims	and	reputations	less	immediately	accessible	for	evaluation	by	the	elites	in	
whose	 service	 they	 wished	 to	 be	 employed.	 The	 difficulties	 thereby	 posed	 by	 the	




the	 risks	 of	 embarrassment	 for	 the	 patron,	 should	 it	 turn	 out	 that	 one	 had	 sponsored	 a	
                                                 
23	 Galileo	 understood	 this	 well,	 as	 was	 evident	 from	 the	 adroit	 way	 in	 which	 he	 exploited	 his	 ability	 to	
prepare	 superior	 telescopes	 for	 the	 Grand	Duke	 of	 Tuscany,	 Cosimo	 II	 de’	Medici:	 he	 urged	 his	 patron	 to	
present	these	to	other	crowned	heads	in	Europe,	whereby	they	too	might	observe	the	new‐found	moons	of	




that	 drew	 upon	 a	 rhetorical	 tradition	 reaching	 back	 to	 the	 great	 Renaissance	 mathematician	
“Regiomontanus”	 ‐‐	 as	 Johannes	Muller	 of	 Konigsberg	 (1432‐1476)	 styled	 himself.	 See	 Swerdlow	 (1993),	
Boyer	(1985:	Ch.	XV)	on	Renaissance	mathematics;	Keller	(1985)	on	the	program	and	rhetorical	developed	
on	 behalf	 of	mathematical	 training	 during	 the	 1570's	 and	 1580's;	 Feingold	 (1984:Ch.IV),	Westfall	 (1985),	
Biagioli	(1989,	1990,	1993)	on	the	patronage	of	mathematicians.	




fraud	 –	 or	much	worse,	 a	 heretic.	 Thus,	 even	where	 the	 services	 of	 the	mathematically	
trained	 intelligentsia	 might	 be	 sought	 for	 essentially	 practical,	 utilitarian	 motives	 (such	
talents	 being	 useful	 in	 designing	 machinery	 for	 public	 spectacles,	 surveying	 and	
cartography,	 ballistics	 and	 correct	 use	 of	 perspective	 in	pictorial	 arts),	 the	 soundness	 of	
the	candidates'	qualifications	had	become	more	problematic	and	far	from	inconsequential.		
	 In	 other	 words,	 this	 line	 of	 argument	 points	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 especially	
compelling	 reasons	 for	 noble	 patrons	 in	 the	 late	 Renaissance	 to	 delegate	 part	 of	 the	
responsibility	 for	 evaluating	 and	 selecting	 among	 the	 new	 breed	 of	 savants,	 devolving	
those	functions	upon	the	increasingly	self‐aware	communities	of	their	fellow	practitioners	
and	correspondents.	Except	for	those	few	who	were	themselves	versed	in	mathematics	or	





frequently	 taken	as	 the	beginning	of	 the	era	of	modern	mathematics,	 also	witnessed	 the	
formation	 of	 active	 networks	 of	 correspondence	 among	 Europe's	 adepts	 in	 algebra,	
announcing	newly	devised	techniques	and	results;	this	era	initiated	the	modern	tradition	
of	 publicly	 posing	mathematical	 puzzles,	 issuing	 scientific	 challenges,	 announcing	 prizes	
for	 the	solutions	of	problems,	and	 the	holding	of	open	competitions	 to	 test	 the	claims	of	
rival	 experts	 in	 the	mathematical	 arts.25	 	 On	 the	 interpretation	 proposed	 here,	 the	 new	
practices	 of	 disclosure	 constituted	 a	 functional	 response	 to	 heightened	 asymmetric	
information	 problems	 that	 the	mathematization	 of	 natural	 philosophy	 and	 the	 practical	
arts	posed	for	the	Renaissance	system	of	court‐patronage.		
	 The	conditions	just	sketched	here	regarding	the	late	Renaissance	and	early	modern	
system	 of	 court	 patronage	 presented	 a	 situation	 that	 modern	 economists	 describe	 as	
"common	 agency	 contracting"	 involving	 the	 competition	 among	 incompletely	 informed	
principals	 for	 the	 dedicated	 services	 of	 multiple	 agents.	 This	 correspondence	 suggests	
several	 noteworthy	 points	 about	 the	 economic	 organization	 of	 scientific	 activities	 in	
Europe	during	the	late	16th	and	early	17th	centuries.		Firstly,	because	what	the	scientist‐
clients	 had	 to	 offer	 was	 "novelty,”	 at	 any	 point	 in	 time	 the	 “interests”	 (or	 welfare)	 of	
                                                 
25	 On	 patron’s	 self‐restraint	 from	 expressing	 personal	 judgements	 on	 scientific	 claims,	 see	Biagioli	 (1990,	
1993)	 ‐‐	 excepting	 the	extraordinary	 cases	 of	mathematically	proficient	princes	discussed	by	Rose	 (1977)	
and	Biagioli	(1989).	On	the	emergence	of	open	competitions	among	mathematicians,	see	Boyer	(1985:	esp.,	
310‐312),	Feingold	(1984),	Keller	(1985),	and	further	discussion	in	David	(2008:	pp.	46‐49.	




several	 patrons	 could	 not	 be	 jointly	 advanced	 in	 the	 same	 degree.	 In	 other	words,	 as	 a	
consequence	of	the	dominance	in	the	early	history	of	modern	science	of	patrons	who	were	
concerned	with	the	ornamental	rather	than	the	utilitarian	value	of	scientist‐philosophers,	
the	 services	 that	 a	 client	 provided	 to	 his	 several	 patrons	 were	 essentially	 "substitutes"	
rather	than	"complementary"	goods.		
	 Secondly,	 in	 the	majority	 of	 cases	 the	material	 rewards	 offered	 to	 clients	 by	 any	
single	patron	were	not	sufficiently	large	and	certain	to	free	the	former	from	the	quest	for	
multiple	patrons.	The	situation	 typically	being	 that	of	 common	agency,	we	may	draw	on	
the	 results	 of	 	 	 economists’	 game‐theoretic	 analyses	 of	 this	 form	 of	 interaction	 among	
principals	and	their	client‐agents.26		This	tell	us	that	when	the	patron‐principals	cannot	act	
in	 concert,	 and	 lack	 full,	 symmetrically	 distributed	 information	 concerning	 the	 agents’	
respective	 efforts	 and	 costs,	 the	 	 incentive	 contracts	 offered	 to	 clients	 generally	will	 be	







scientist	 like	Galileo	might	 feel	 that	 to	be.27	 It	 thereby	would	reinforce	 the	choice	on	 the	
part	 of	would‐be	 clients	 of	 research	 and	 publication	 strategies	 that	would	 lead	 towards	
widening	the	circle	of	their	repute.		
	 Thirdly,	 as	 has	 been	 shown	 by	 the	 growing	 literature	 devoted	 to	 analyses	 of	
economic	 mechanism	 design	 under	 conditions	 of	 common	 agency	 contracting,	 the	
                                                 
26	A	more	detailed	treatment	of	the	proposition	in	this	and	the	next	paragraph	will	be	found	in	found	in	David	
(2008:	 sect.	 5.1—pp	 xx‐xx),	 which	 draws	 principally	 on	 Stole	 (1990)	 and	 the	 review	 provided	 by	 Dixit	
(1995).	 	The	literature	on	common	agency	games	is	now	quite	extensive,	having	expanded	rapidly	in	many	
applied	directions,	 including	some	 that	have	a	bearing	on	 the	equilibrium	 terms	of	patron‐client	 contracts	





p.130	 ‐‐	 makes	 it	 plain	 that	 he	 regarded	 a	 career	 serving	 many	 low	 status	 patrons	 for	 piecemeal	
compensation	 to	be	 servitu	meretricia	 –	 a	 cheapening,	 “harlot‐like”	employment.	According	 to	Biagioli	 this	









the	 agent	 than	 is	 the	 case	 when	 the	 services	 performed	 for	 different	 principals	 are	
complements.	In	effect,	the	competition	among	patrons	to	command	the	faithful	attention	
of	 an	agent/client	would	 lead	 to	 contracts	 that	 allowed	 the	 latter	 to	 retain	more	 "rents"	
from	the	specialized	information	he	possessed.	This	provided	greater	rewards	for	scientific	
activities	than	would	have	resulted	otherwise,	were	there	only	a	single	possible	patron	on	
the	 scene,	 or	 had	 the	 patrons	 predominantly	 enjoyed	 positive	 externalities	 from	 others’	
support	 of	 the	 agent’s	 efforts	 –	 the	 characteristic	 situation	 where	 there	 are	 significant	
“spillovers”	of	utilitarian	benefits	from	new	knowledge.	
	 There	 is	 in	 the	 story	 related	here	 an	historical	 irony	well	worth	 remarking	upon,	
especially	 as	 it	 serves	 also	 to	 underscore	 the	 tenacity	 of	 the	 past's	 hold	 on	 the	
incrementally	 evolving	 institutions	 that	 channel	 the	 course	 of	 economic	 change.28 	 	 The	
nub	of	 it	 is	 simply	 this:	 an	essentially	pre‐capitalist,	European	aristocratic	disposition	 to	
award	 patronage	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 enhancing	 rulers'	 political	 powers	 symbolically	 ‐‐	




	 The	 norms	 of	 cooperation	 and	 information	 disclosure	 within	 the	 community	 of	
scientists,	 and	 their	 institutionalization	 through	 the	 activities	 of	 formal	 scientific	
organizations	 thus	 emerged	 (in	 part	 at	 least)	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 informational	
requirements	of	a	system	of	patronage	in	which	the	competition	among	noble	patrons	for	
prestigious	 clients	 was	 crucial.	 Likewise,	 the	 initiation	 of	 State	 patronage	 of	 scientific	
academies	was	propelled	as	much	by	the	ornamental	motives	of	absolute	monarchies	as	it	






                                                 
28	 On	 the	 theme	 of	 "path	 dependence"	 in	 the	 dynamics	 of	 economic	 systems,	 see,	 e.g.	David	 (1988,	 1994,	
2001,	2007).	
29 See David (2008: sect. 5.3, esp. pp.77-81) on the evidence against the contentions that in France the emergence of 
state-patronage for science in the form of the royal academies,  was a consequence of the greatly increased costs of 
the new scientific pursuits – the so-called “Fontenelle Thesis.”   





substitutes	 that	 characterized	 the	 relations	 among	 clients	 and	 patrons	 during	 the	 late	
Renaissance.		










well‐known	 paradoxical	 observation	 that,	 despite	 the	 remarkable	 record	 of	 scientific	
inquiry	 and	 technological	 accomplishments	 produced	 in	 China	 during	 the	 Sung	Dynasty	
(960‐1279	 C.E.)	 ‐‐	 and	 richly	 documented	 by	 Joseph	 Needham	 (1954‐2008)	 and	 his	




patronage	 of	 rival	 political	 authorities	 at	 numerous	 geographically	 dispersed	 and	
culturally	 diverse	 courts	 and	 academies	 ‐‐	 contributed	 not	 only	 to	 the	 flourishing	 of	
science,	 but	 to	preservation	 of	 the	 advances	 that	 had	been	made	 in	 the	 accumulation	of	
reliable	knowledge	upon	which	further	research	could	build.		The	existence	in	Europe	of	an	
extensive	contiguous	territory,	over	which	political	power	was	decentralized	to	multiple,	
                                                 
30	 Needham	 (1969)	 posed	 the	 problem	 of	 why	 it	 was	 that	 although	 Chinese	 civilization	 had	 been	 “more	
efficient	 than	 ‘occidental’	 civilization	 in	 applying	 human	 natural	 knowledge	 to	 practical	 human	 needs”	
between	the	 first	century	B.C.	and	the	 fifteenth	century	A.D.,	 in	 the	centuries	 that	 followed	 it	was	Western	
Europe	 that	emerged	as	 the	 technologically	and	 industrially	more	dynamic	 society.	Needham’s	answers	 to	
this	question,	however,	came	to	focus	more	on	issues	of	class	and	culture,	than	on	political	structure.	For	all	
its	 rationalism	 and	 organizational	 effectiveness	 in	 its	 early	 stages	 (from	 the	 4th	 through	 the	 8th	 century),	
China’s	Mandarin	bureaucracy	later	came	to	obstruct	scientific	undertakings	and	could	not	make	up	for	the	
lack	of	a	 “mercantile	culture”	 that	he	saw	as	 the	core	of	Europe’s	capitalism	and	expansionism.	See	Cohen	
(1994:	Chs.	6.3‐6.5)	on	the	problem	of	the	non‐emergence	of	the	16th	‐	17th	century	Scientific	Revolution	in	
China;	 Mokyr	 (1990:	 Ch.	 9,	 esp.	 pp.	 228‐238)	 on	 the	 different,	 so‐called	 “Needham	 problem”	 ‐‐	 why	 the	
Industrial	 Revolution	 of	 the	 18th	 century	 did	 not	 happen	 in	 China.	 Neither	 of	 these	 surveys	 focus	 on	 the	








contending	 centers	 of	 authority,	was	 a	 distinctive	 and	historically	 contingent	 product	 of	
region’s	cultural	and	political	history.	 	The	 logic	of	vassalage	 institutions	 in	the	medieval	
epoch	had	given	rise	to	a	political	landscape	of	fragmented	and	contending	principalities,	
each	 governed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 personal	 authority.	 The	 fragmented	 structure	 of	 political	
authority	 in	 Renaissance	 and	 early	 modern	 Europe	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 providing	 the	
protection	of	statistical	independence	from	the	workings	of	the	variety	of	systematic	forces	
and	exogenous	disturbances	 to	order	 that	 could	 interrupt	 the	advancement	of	 science	 in	
any	one	place	and	 time,	 and	 that	often	had	done	 so.	By	 the	 same	 token,	 the	practices	of	
open	 science	 that	 developed	 within	 the	 European	 political	 and	 social	 context	 were	
conducive	 to	 maintaining	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 through	 radiating	 networks	 of	
distributed	 and	 intellectually	 variegated	 actors.	 These	 networks	 of	 scholarly	
communication,	whose	nodes	 initially	were	situated	 in	 the	courts	of	Renaissance	nobles,	
stimulated	and	imparted	sustaining	momentum	to	the	cumulative,	transformative	process	
that	uniquely	characterized	the	advancement	of	science	in	that	part	of	 the	world	 	To	put	




	 Rather	 and	having	emerged	and	 survived	as	useful	 epiphenomena	of	 “mechanical	
philosophy,”	 a	 new	 organum	 of	 intellectual	 inquiry,	 the	 institutions	 of	 open	 science	 are	
thus	 seen	 to	 be	 independent	 and	 in	 some	 measure	 fortuitous	 social	 and	 political	
constructs.	 They	 are	 cultural	 legacies	 of	 European	 history	 that	 continue	 profoundly	 to	
influence	 the	modern	 systemic	 efficacy	 of	 the	 scientific	 research	process.	 Being	 in	 some	
significant	degree	exogenous	to	actual	scientific	practice,	these	features	of	the	institutional	
landscape	 in	 the	 world’s	 representative	 democracies	 can	 be	 subjected	 more	 easily	 to	




and	 therefore	 respect	 the	 potential	 fragility	 of	 the	 institutional	 matrix	 within	 which	
modern	science	has	flourished.	
	 Open	science	norms	and	institutions	are	a	relatively	recent	social	innovation	whose	
workings	 must	 be	 continually	 re‐created	 as	 “social	 facts”.	 	 This	 regenerative	 process	
depends	upon	the	scientific	practitioners	themselves	recognizing	that	much	of	the	“power”	




that	 their	 research	communities	possess	 for	 the	successful	pursuit	of	 reliable	knowledge	
derives	 from	 their	 personal	 appreciation	 of	 and	 commitment	 to	 behaviors	 that	 conform	
broadly	to	the	 informal	“cognitive	norms,”	as	well	as	to	the	formal	regulations	governing	
their	 activities.	 In	 short,	 the	 sustained	 functionality	 of	 these	 vulnerable	 institutional	
legacies	 ultimately	 rests	 not	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 some	 distant,	 unknown	 and	 hopefully	wise	
designers	of	public	policy,	but	upon	scientists’	acceptance	of	responsibility	for	day‐to‐day	
individual	and	collective	actions	in	support	of	“good	scientific	conduct	conjoined	with	good	







science	 research	 in	 the	 public	 interest.	 Beginning	 as	 a	 reactive	 awakening	 among	
researchers	in	particular	scientific	domains,	this	movement	gradually	attracted	broader	a	
broader	and	more	diverse	following,	and	soon	drew	encouragement	from	some	quarters	of	




immediately	available	 legal	mechanisms	 that	could	be	deployed	 to	mitigate	 the	potential	
for	 long‐term	societal	and	cultural	harms	to	flow	from	unchecked	transformations	of	 the	
sort	 that	 were	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 international	 regime	 intellectual	 property	 rights	
protections.31		
	 The	 following	 pages	 briefly	 reviews	 those	 developments,	 focusing	 first	 on	 the	
nature	of	perceived	 threats	 that	were	 found	 to	be	especially	worrisome	 for	 fundamental	
advances	 in	 scientific	 knowledge,	 and	 then	 turning	 to	 highlight	 several	 particularly	
noteworthy	 aspects	 of	 the	 	 countervailing	 responses	what	were	mobilized	 from	 various	
elements	of	within	national	and	international	academic	science	communities.	
	 	Because	 it	 may	 be	 both	 an	 instructive	 and	 a	 promising	 sign	 for	 the	 future	
sustainability	of	open	science	institutions,	the	general	observation	that	deserve	emphasis	
                                                 
31 See Maskus and Reichman (2005: Ch. 1 (on “The globalization of private knowledge goods and the privatization 
of global public goods,” by the editors of this compendious work).  





action	was	possible	without	 (and	possibly	because)	 the	 scientific	 issues	 at	 stake	did	not	
become	 publicly	 politicized.	 Instead,	 reactions	 to	 perceived	 threats	 to	 the	 effective	 and	
efficient	 conduct	 of	 exploratory	 science	 came	 initially	 from	 within	 the	 West’s	 leading	
research	universities.			Those	varied	expressions	of	alarm,	and	some	among	the	proposed	
defensive	 responses,	 elicited	 crucial	 reinforcement	 from	 the	 leadership	 of	 national	
government	 agencies	 that	had	direct	 responsibilities	 for	 the	 allocation	 and	 regulation	of	
public	 research	 funding,	 especially	 the	agencies,	ministries,	 institutes	 that	 systematically	
drew	upon	distinguished	members	of	the	relevant	research	communities	when	filling	top‐
level	 administrative	 positions.	 	 Eventually,	 as	 promising	models	 for	 corrective	 	 national	
policy	 action	 became	 more	 frequent	 and	 visible,	 and	 so	 lent	 themselves	 to	 general	
recommendations	 illustrated	 by	 successful	 concrete	 implementations,	 international	
organizations	(such	as	the	OECD)	issued	codified	“principles	and	guidelines”	for	protecting	
researchers’	wide	and	easy	access	to	high‐quality	scientific	data	and	information	that	had	




	 To	quickly	 take	up	 the	 thread	of	 this	 story	 closer	 to	 its	beginning,	one	may	 recall	
that	 even	 though	 the	 transformative	 impact	 of	 the	 enormous	 potentialities	 for	 practical	
application	 and	 further	 augmentation	 of	 scientific	 and	 technical	 advances	 in	 digital	
information	 technologies	 and	 biotechnology	were	 already	 incipient,	 and	 grasped	 by	 the	
participants	 	 during	 the	 1970’s,	 it	was	 not	 until	 the	 1980’s	 that	 their	 unanticipated	 and	
disruptive	impacts	began	to	touch	the	institutional	infrastructure	supporting	the	conduct	
of	 publicly	 funded	 scientific	 research.	 	 The	 ramifying	 industrial	 sequelae	 of	 those	
technological	advances	and	raised	the	strategic	value	for	businesses	in	both	domestic	and	
international	 markets	 of	 stronger,	 and	 more	 readily	 enforceable	 legal	 protections	 that	
could	be	afforded	to	holders	of	intellectual	property	rights.		Along	with	losses	of	previous	
dominance	in	the	markets	for	durable	manufactures,	 this	heightened	concerns	 in	 leading	
western	government	circles	about	possible	future	threats	to	their	economies’	competitive	
advantages	in	information‐intensive	and	bio‐medical	product	markets.	
                                                 
32	The	following	text	draws	freely	on	David	and	Uhlir	(2007)	and	the	author’s	policy‐oriented	publications	
(cited	in	the	Prologue,	esp.	footnotes	3,	4,	8	(above).		




	 The	 resultant	 government	 efforts	 to	 favorably	 adjust	 domestic	 and	 international	
IPR	 regimes,	 combined	 with	 budgetary	 pressures	 to	 curtail	 public	 	 expenditures	 for	
scientific	 and	 engineering	 research,	 abetted	 by	 other	 transient	 circumstances	 	 (some	 of	
which	already	were	noticed	in	the	Prologue),	produced	a	marked	shift	in	the	structure	of	
national	 research	 policies.	 This	 movement	 was	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 further	
“commodification”	of	science,	and	gave	greater	weight	to	near‐term	“market	valorization”	
(rather	 than	 long‐term	 “social	 valorization”)	 in	 assessing	 the	 likely	 pay‐offs	 for	 tax‐
supported	“applied	research.”	Correspondingly,	the	relative	share	(and	in	some	cases	also	
absolute	 levels)	 of	 state	 support	 for	 exploratory,	 fundamental	 science,	 and	 long‐term	
mission	 oriented	 R&D	 programs	 at	 academic	 institutions	 and	 civilian	 government	





potentially	cover	all	 forms	of	data	and	 information	that	can	be	digitally	 inscribed,	and	 in	
some	national	and	regional	juridictions	sui	generis	intellectual	property	rights	protections	
have	been	created	by	novel	statutes	and	for	the	benefit	of	parties	that	have	invested	in	the	
construction	of	databases	containing	all	manner	of	 information	 (including	 “works	of	 low	
authorship”)	 and	whether	 these	 are	 copyrightable	 or	 not.	 	 Similarly,	 the	patentability	 of	
inventions	 and	 discoveries	 now	 is	 construed	 more	 broadly,	 especially	 in	 the	 U.S.,	
encompassing	 claims	 to	 information	 that	 formerly	 would	 have	 been	 deemed	 “facts	 of	
nature”	and	hence	ineligible	for	protection;	patents	are	issued	on	an	unprecedented	scale	
to	 inventors	 of	 tools	 and	 techniques	 in	 many	 research	 fields,	 and	 particularly	 in	 the	
biomedical	 and	 computer	 sciences,	 but	 at	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 to	 “business	
models”	implemented	by	computer	software.	
	 Technical	 information	 that	 in	 former	 times	would	 be	 likely	 have	 been	 left	 in	 the	
public	domain	now	tends	to	be	swiftly	appropriated	as	intellectual	property,	unless	special	








licensing	 negotiations,	 or	 in	 litigation	 arising	 from	 infringement	 suits.33	 	 Moreover,	
restrictive	 licensing	 practices	 and	 increasingly	 effective	 “digital	 rights	 management”	
technologies	combine	to	provide	additional	 layers	of	“enclosure”	beyond	those	conferred	
by	the	transformed	regime	of	intellectual	property	rights	protections.				
	 Even	 as	 prospects	 for	 the	 new	 legal	 and	 technical	 foundations	 of	 “intellectual	
capitalism,”	were	being	enthusiastically	embraced	 in	some	entrepreneurial	quarters,	and	
envisaged	 in	 rather	 sanguine	 academic	 writings,34	 this	 movement;	 troubling	 collateral	
developments	were	attracting	adverse	attention.		The	creation	of	new	legal	property	rights	
and	 enforcement	 mechanisms	 for	 digital	 technology‐based	 innovations	 in	 information	
goods	 markets,	 while	 often	 rationalized	 in	 the	 name	 of	 scientific	 and	 technological	
progress,	increasingly	was	seen	to	have	been	promoted	by	commercial	interests	for	other,	
special	 purposes.	 In	 some	 quarters	 of	 scholarly	 publishing	 (as	 in	 other	 branches	 of	 the	
media	 industry)	 incumbent	 firms	 sought	 extended	 and	 more	 strongly	 enforced	 global	
copyright	 protection	 in	 order	 to	 stabilize	 traditional	 business	 models	 by	 blocking	
incursions	by	new	entrants’	pursuit	of	disruptive	business	strategies.	
	 These	 developments	 impinged	 also	 on	 the	 sphere	 of	 academic	 and	 other	 public	
research	organizations,	noticeably	first	affecting	libraries’	online	subscription	costs.	In	the	
U.S.	 under	 the	 Bayh‐Dole	 Act	 (1980),	 research	 universities	 ‐‐	 having	 been	 permitted	 to	
seek	 patents	 for	 discoveries	 and	 inventions	 resulting	 from	 their	 conduct	 of	 federally	
funded	research	–	were	actively	 filing	 for	and	receiving	patents	on	technical	advances	 in	
the	 frontier	 areas	 of	 biotechnology	 and	 computer	 hardware	 and	 software,	 as	 well	 as	
software	 copyrights.	 	 Where	 the	 discoveries	 and	 inventions	 in	 question	 were	 basic	
research	tools	that	had	open	wider	opportunities	for	further	investigation,	key	patents	on	
elements	in	the	basic	tool	sets	of	those	frontier	areas	gradually	began	to	be	recognized	as	





                                                 
33 See David (2007b), for further details regarding this perspective, and references to the literature on the 
transformations in the nature and economic significance of the patent (and copyright) systems that took place during 
the past quarter-century.    
34 See Grandstrand (1999) for an uncommonly thoughtful examination of the concept and material foundations of 
“intellectual capitalism” as a techno-institutional construct, and a guarded but generally welcoming appraisal of this 
emergent phenomenon as a new and a promising future stage in the evolution of market- driven capitalism.  




of	available	resources	of	 their	 current	projects	 to	speeding	 the	production,	 checking	and	
write‐up	for	publication	of	its	novel	and	striking	findings,	upon	which	to	ground	claims	for	
priority	 of	 discovery	 or	 invention,	 rather	 than	 spending	 time	 on	 transparently	
documenting	and	making	the	those	findings	available	for	the	use	of	other	scientists	in	the	
same	 field	or	research	domains.	To	do	otherwise	would	risk	sacrificing	 the	possibility	of	




of	 “neurotic	 tension”	 for	 those	 working	 within	 such	 a	 system	 –	 was	 sharpened	 where	
funding	 was	 more	 tightly	 restricted	 and	 exploratory	 science	 projects	 faced	 severely	
binding	resource	constraints.		
Unfortunately	the	latter	only	worsened	the	long‐standing	reality	of	public	agencies’	
policies	 in	 regard	 to	 civilian	 scientific	 research	 programs,	 which	 systematically	 under‐
funded	activities	such	as	data	documentation	and	curation,	and	transparent	description	of	
research	procedures,	 tasks	 that	 are	best	 be	 carried	out	 by	 those	directly	 engaged	 in	 the	
research	itself.	Without	adequate	support	being	explicitly	provided	for	rapid,	high	quality	
documentation	 and	 responses	 to	 request	 to	 share	 research	materials	 and	 tools,	 project	
directors	 are	 unlikely	 to	 divert	 limited	 project	 resources	 to	 helping	 external	 peers	
(including	known	or	potential	rivals	in	the	field)	to	quickly	replicate,	assimilate	and	exploit	
the	conceptual	and	material	tools	that	their	latest	results	would	provide.		
Whatever	 stimulus	 the	 Bayh‐Dole	 Act	 had	 imparted	 to	 increasing	 applied,	
commercially	oriented	research	in	universities	and	publicly	funded	research	institutes,	the	
institutional	re‐orientations	following	in	its	train	also	brought	unintended	and	interrelated	
impacts	 that	 were	 detrimental	 to	 continued	 efficient	 academic	 science	 collaborations	
aimed	at	advancing	research	explorations	in	frontier	areas.		By	creating	new	incentives	for	
maintaining	 secrecy	 while	 racing	 for	 priority	 in	 obtaining	 research	 results	 on	 which	
stronger	 legal	 protections	 for	 valuable	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 could	 be	 secured	 by	
publicly	 funded	 institutions,	 it	 exacerbated	 the	 conflict	 that	 already	 existed	between	 the	
cooperative	norms	of	open	science,	and	the	latter’s	reputational	reward	system	based	on	
validated	 claims	 to	 priority	 in	 new	 scientific	 discoveries	 and	 inventions.	 Combined	with	
the	 chronic	under‐funding	of	 grant	 support	 for	 	 disclosure	of	 transparently	documented	
data	 and	 technical	 information	 about	 details	 of	 the	 research	 processes	 underlying	








data,	 and	 introducing	 additional	 incentives	 for	 rapid	 disclosure	 of	 new	 methods	 and	
findings	 t	 reinforced	 the	 “natural”	 tendencies	 of	 researchers	 to	 “keep	 going”	when	 their	
effort	 are	 yielding	 interesting	 results,	 rather	 than	 pausing	 to	 document	 and	 render	
transparent	for	others	the	steps	that	them	to	that	happy	state.		The	incentives	created	by	
the	 open	 science	 reward	 system	 itself	 works	 to	 reinforce	 such	 choices	 concerning	 the	
allocation	 the	human	resources	provided	 to	 the	project	by	 its	 grant	 funding.	 	 Sacrificing	
other	 desirable	 activities	 to	 speed	 the	 production,	 checking	 and	 write‐up	 of	 novel	 and	
striking	results	 is	a	decision	that	 follows	directly	 from	importance	of	being	able	 to	claim	
priority	of	discovery,	attested	to	by	priority	of	publication.	For,	that	is	the	key	requirement	
of	 the	 reputational	 reward	 system	 based	 upon	 (scientific)	 peer	 esteem,	 and	 all	 the	 ego‐
gratifying	 and	material	 benefits	 that	 a	 research	may	wish	 to	 derive	 therefrom	 –	 among	
which	 the	 enhanced	 probably	 of	 successes	 in	 future	 competitions	 for	 research	 funding	
surely	will	be	a	prominent	consideration.		
	 Without	 adequate	 additional	 support	 being	 explicitly	 provided	 for	 rapid,	 high	
quality	documentation,	research	projects	are	unlikely	to	divert	 their	 limited	resources	to	
activities	 that	 are	 likely	 to	help	others	 (including	 rivals	 in	 the	 field)	quickly	 to	 replicate,	
assimilate	 and	 exploit	 the	 further	 implications	 that	 may	 flow	 from	 their	 project’s	 fresh	
findings.	 	 	 The	 “Bayh‐Dole	 reorientation”	 of	 institutional	 incentives,	 by	 adding	 to	 the	
attractions	of	racing	for	priority	in	obtaining	research	results	on	which	stronger	and	more	
valuable	 intellectual	property	 rights	 could	be	 secured,	 thus	 intensified	a	 recognized	pre‐
existing	conflict	between	the	role	that	priority	of	publication	played	in	the	reward	system	
of	 open	 science	 and	 the	 latter’s	 the	 cooperative	 ethos,	 as	 well	 giving	 rise	 within	 the	
academic	 research	 environment	 of	 new,	 legally	 protected	 and	 institutionally	 sanctioned	
impediments	 to	 the	 sharing	 of	 new	 information	 and	 the	 collective	 advancement	 of	
scientifically	reliable	knowledge.				
	 Academic	 scientists	 working	 in	 physics,	 astronomy,	 atmospheric	 and	 molecular	
chemistry,	 and	 the	mathematical	 sciences,	were	 especially	 quick	 to	 register	 alarm	about		
about	 the	possible	damages	 that	could	result	 	 from	the	 incursion	of	 intellectual	property	
rights	 claims.	 	 	 Those	 were	 fields	 characterized	 by	 strong	 traditions	 of	 international	





long	 been	 presumed	 that	 technical	 information	 and	 data	 about	 the	 observational	
instruments	and	techniques	that	had	enabled	discoveries	of	“facts	of	nature”	should	be	left	
in	the	public	domain	‐‐along	with	the	discoveries	themselves.35		
	 Elsewhere	 in	 the	 universities,	 however,	 a	 new	 set	 of	 opportunities	 and	
accompanying	 tensions	were	emerging	as	an	unintended	result	of	government	“reforms”	
inspired	 by	 the	 Bayh‐Dole	 Act	 (1980),	 one	 effect	 of	 which	 was	 to	 bring	 into	 existence	
within	the	academic	institution	a	dual	system	of	rewards	for	faculty	researchers	in	science	
and	engineering	departments,	in	which	the	two	constituent	systems’	respective	effects	on	
transparency	 and	 sharing	 of	 research	 information	 and	 data	 were	 largely	 inimical.	 	 The	









and	 genetics,	where	 the	 frontiers	of	 research	were	 advancing	 rapidly	 and	new	 scientific	
findings	 could	 be	 quite	 readily	 recast	 as	 commercial	 innovations.	 	 For	 those	 who	were	
attracted	 by	 the	 latter	 prospects,	 the	 university’s	 newly	 apparent	 interest	 in	 patents	 on	
publicly	 funded	 research	 results	 was	 sufficiently	 appropriate	 warrant	 for	 them	 to	 take	
steps	 to	maintain	 secrecy	 about	 their	 ongoing	 research	 projects	 (and	 to	 tightly	 restrict	
                                                 
35 The view widely held in these fields prior to WWII -- that it was “inappropriate” to patent scientific discoveries 
and inventions that might have important practical applications – also was strongly supported by that era’s major 
private patron. The Rockefeller Foundation, through its general policies and the funding decisions of its Natural 
Sciences Research Division, beginning in the 1920’s, played a critical role in advancing research, e.g., on the 
chemistry of toxins and antibiotics (most notably, penicillin). See Jonas (1989), and Lax (2005). It is noteworthy 
too that in the domain of genetics and genomics, the Human Genome Project that was taking shape in  the latter 
1980s (and formally launched in 1990) had modelled itself on the Big Science projects in particle physics and 
astronomy,  not only with regard to its international scope and time horizon, but also in the HPG’s resistance (under 
first director, James D. Watson) to pressures to patent fragmentary gene sequences – which led to Watson being 
fired by the Director of the NIH. Subsequently, the HGP, with the important backing of the Wellcome Trust in the 
U.K., adopted a policy of daily disclosures of its data on new sequences. That stance was publicly endorsed in 2000 
by President Clinton’s announcement that when HPG’s sequencing of the genome would be completed, the results 
would not be patented and the data would be made available for use by all researchers, setting a model for publicly 
funded scientific research projects in biogenetics, genomics and proteinomics. See, Sulston and Ferry (2002); also 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Genome_Project; http://www.genome.gov/10001763.  
 
    











research	 problems	 and	 their	 possible	 solutions.	 	 Moreover,	 it	 signified	 the	 casual	
abandonment	 of	 collegiality	 in	 pursuit	 of	 another,	 defining	 common	 purpose	 of	 the	
university’s	 faculty.36	 Whatever	 socially	 useful	 ends	 might	 be	 served	 by	 the	 research	
knowledge	 gained,	 and	 the	 patents	 to	 which	 it	 lead	 might	 serve,	 the	 process	 of	 closely	
guarding	both	had	restricted	communications	between	and	among	the	graduate	students	
and	 post‐doctoral	 fellows	 who	 were	 engaged	 on	 such	 projects,	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
department’s	students,	as	well	faculty	members	who	took	no	part	in	them.			
	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 intra‐departmental	 issues,	 new	 and	 increasingly	 time‐
consuming	foci	of	conflicting	interests	emerged	elsewhere	within	the	research	universities,	
having	 been	 created	 by	 the	 prospects	 of	 revenues	 that	might	 become	 available	 to	 some	
departments	and	schools	 from	sales	of	patents	and	copyright	 licenses,	or	 their	 exclusive	
licensing	 to	 business	 firms	 ‐‐	 let	 alone	 to	 the	 equity	 that	 the	 institution	 might	 hold	 in	
faculty‐research	based	start‐up	ventures.	A	whole	new	world	of	institutional	level	conflict‐
of‐interest	 problems	 awaited	 acknowledgment	 and	 recognition.	 	 In	 the	 U.S.	 research	
universities,	 the	 issues	 thus	raised	were	 felt	most	palpably	by	the	administrative	 leaders	
responsible	 for	 decisions	 about	 new	 faculty	 and	 staff	 appointments	 and	 promotions,	 as	
well	 as	 for	 allocating	 space	 and	 research	 facilities	 that	 were	 funded	 by	 research	 grants	
over	whose	results	the	university	might	assert	intellectual	property	ownership.37			But,	by	
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Owen-Smith and Powell (2001) on tensions within the Biology Department at Stanford University. Still 
more seriously, placing restrictions on the freedom of student research assistants and post-docs to consult any 
member of the faculty and discuss their work with fellow students was seen more generally by faculty members and 
university leaders as potentially threatening the institution’s educational purpose. More specifically, it was at odds 
with widespread commitment to conduct important aspects of the graduate science and engineering training in the 
context of on-going research projects” whose work was open for discussion among students and between students 
and their professors – a distinctive feature of America’s research universities that (rightly) was held to be a major 
factor contributing to their effectiveness and international prestige..  
37 The	Bayh‐Dole	Act	of	1980	and	its	sequelae	compounded	the	already	complicated	hierarchical	structures	of	
governance	and	 resource	allocation	processes	 that	was	 typical	 of	major	U.S.	 (private	 and	public)	 research	
universities.	Discussions of this and some  related issues pertinent to the American institutional context can be 
found in the contributions to American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1993), and David, Mowery and 
Steinmueller (1994) – with particular focus on issues arising in university-industry research relationships. David 







to	 fundamental	 research	 tools	 in	 computing,	 biomedical	 science	 and	 nano‐technologies.		
Other,	 still	 more	 surprising	 and	 disconcerting	 expressions	 of	 discontent	 with	 the	 new	
regime	on	the	part	of	corporate	vice‐presidents	of	research,	would	take	somewhat	longer	
to	surface	publicly.38		
			 Many	 complex	 policy	 issues	 are	 encountered	 in	 attempting	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 proper	
balance	 between	 the	 benefits	 and	 drawbacks	 of	 privatization	 and	 commercialization	 of	
data	and	 information,	especially	as	 these	affect	public‐sector	science.	Similar	 “trade‐offs”	
arising	 in	 making	 decisions	 about	 the	 imposition	 of	 government	 “security	 restrictions”	
upon	certain	lines	of	research.39		These	policy	quandaries	resist	quick	and	simple	solutions	
at	 the	 societal	 level.	 When	 they	 arise	 from	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 conflicting	 purposes	 and	
associated	 reward	 systems	 within	 the	 same	 organization,	 the	 understandable	 internal	
political	 pressures	 to	 resolve	 them	 by	 compromise	 is	 likely	 to	 compromising	 the	
effectiveness	with	which	many	 among	 those	 purposes	 can	 be	 served,	 and	 this	 holds	 for	
government	agencies	no	less	than	for	academic	institutions.	An	awareness	of	the	likelihood	
of	such	outcomes	was	a	significant	factor	motivating	the	“bottom	up”	initiatives	on	the	part	
                                                                                                                                                            
(2001b) examines parallel problems that were manifesting themselves some years later in the context of publicly 
funded research universities in the UK.  
38 See, e.g., Hertzfeld, Link and Vonortas (2006) for findings from a survey of executives from 60 major R&D 
intensive U.S. corporations, which present a decidedly unflattering contrast between  their experiences in patent 
licensing negotiations with university representatives, and comparable negotiations conducted with other business 
firms.  David (2006: pp. 267-271) confronts European misapprehensions and expectations with the quantitative 
record of the 1985-2005 performance of the Bayh-Dole regime in stimulating and ‘transferring’ new technologies 
for commercial exploitation by U.S. companies.  
39 In 1999, responding to “a request from several federal science agencies” in the U.S. (concerned about the 
potential outcome of legislative proposals for legal protection of database rights introduced in the U.S. Congress 
following the EU Directive of 1996), the Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications of the 
NAS, the National Academy of Science for a National Research Council Study Committee – tasked to “identify, 
examine and evaluate the various existing and proposed policy approaches [for] Promoting Access to Scientific and 
Technical Data for the Public Interest.” See: National Resource Council (1999). The interest of the government 
“science agencies” was reflected not only their initiation of the request (and quite likely in funding the Study 
Committee’s work).It may be inferred from the concentration of their personnel among the participants in the 
January 14-15 Workshop held in Washington, DC to obtain “broad input from representatives of the main identified 
interest groups.” Each of the following organizations was “represented by 4 to 6 individual participants in the 
Workshop: National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, U.S. Geological Survey, National Institute of Standards and Technology.  The Committee’s report 
(NRC 1999:pp.10-12) recommended “Legislative Principles” for any new statutory protections of proprietary 
rights, in order to curtail the damage to public interests that could otherwise ensue from further restriction of access 
to scientific and technical data. The thrust of the recommendations for government policy actions (pp.12-13) was 
that data owned or controlled by the U.S. government should be disseminated for not-for-profit and commercial 
uses by all users on a non-exclusive basis, and made available at the marginal costs of its reproduction and 
distribution.  




of	 academic	 scientists	 who	 undertook	 ’to	 devise	 appropriate	 means	 of	 protecting	 the	
culture	 and	 practices	 of	 open	 science	 at	 levels	 that	were	more	 immediately	 under	 their	
governance	and	future	control.				
		 That	 this	 undertaking	 also	 proved	 to	 be	 feasible	 does	 not	 seem	 so	 remarkable	 –	
when	 considered	 in	 retrospect.	 Researchers	 in	 modern	 public	 science	 and	 engineering	
organizations	 were	 at	 the	 forefront	 of	 many	 of	 the	 basic	 technological	 advances	 that	
underlay	 new	paradigms	 of	 digitally	 networked	 information	 creation	 and	 dissemination	
activities:‐	 high‐speed	mainframe	 computers	 and	 packet‐switched	 digital	 data	 networks	
with	large	bandwidth,		the	TPC/IP	protocols	of	the	Internet	and	the	World	Wide	Web,	and	
still	 later	 innovations	 supporting	 Grid	 computing	 and	Web‐based	middleware	 platforms	
facilitating	 interoperability	 in	 distributed	 computing	 and	 data	 storage,	 and	 providing	
ubiquitous	 access	 to	 those	 and	 other	 services	 “in	 the	 clouds.”	 From	 these	 and	 other	
remarkable	 tools	 that	 scientific	 workgroups	 fashioned,	 	 re‐or‐less	 as	 research	 “by‐
products”	 in	 order	 	 to	 solve	 to	 the	 ever‐pressing	 practical	 problems	 (of	 computation,	
communication,	and	data	capture	and	retrieval)	that	are	recurring	encountered	by	projects	
committed	 to	 pushing	 the	 frontiers	 of	 knowledge,	 had	 	 sprung	 a	 wide	 array	 of	 the	
Information	 society’s”	 enabling	 technological	 elements.	 	 It	 is	 an	 irony	 of	 history	 that	
through	the	impetus	thereby	imparted	to	mutually	reinforcing	technical,	institutional	and	
market	 transformations,	 the	 unintended	 ramifications	 of	 “gifts”	 from	 open	 science	
communities	came	back	upon	them	–like	a	surprising	blow	from	a	returm	boomerang	–	in	





palpable	 for	 some	 among	 them,	 took	 shape	 in	 numerous,	 specific	 defensive	 actions	
accompanied	by	 the	 formulation	of	 supporting	 rationales.	 	 	 To	protect	 their	 accustomed	
ways	of	“doing	science”,	a	new	array	of	tools	and	procedures	were	devised	to	facilitate	the	
creation	 of	 sustainably	 available	 digital	 information	 resources.	 These	 have	 included	
institutionally	hosted	repositories	for	scientific	pre‐prints,	journal	articles	and	educational	
materials,	“open	access”	electronic	journals	published	with	the	support	of	universities	and	
not‐for‐profit	 scientific	 organizations,	 public‐domain	 digital	 data	 archives	 and	 federated	





to	 pursue	 the	 research	 results	 that	would	 thus	 be	made	more	 readily	 accessible:	 open‐
source	 software	 systems,	 and	middleware	platforms	 that	 permitted	 remote	operation	of	
diverse	 observational	 instruments	 whose	 output‐streams	 could	 be	 linked	 to	 high‐speed	
data	 analysis	 and	 real‐time	 simulation	 capabilities,	 are	 now	 basic	 components	 of	 the	
“cyberinfrastructure”	 for	research	scientists	and	engineers.	 	These	are	complemented	by	
the	rapidly	growing	 toolset	 for	achieving	and	maintaining	high	reliability	 in	 the	evolving	
bodies	of	specialized	software	code	and	data	‐‐beginning	with	client‐server	version	control	
systems	for	distributed	development	of	software	algorithms,	and	automated	mirroring	of	
distributed	 correction	 and	 annotation	 of	 datasets.	 	 Created	 to	 address	 the	 needs	 of	
research,	these	technical	innovations	have	yielded	beneficial	“spillovers’	for	other	forms	of	
collective	 pursuits	 whose	 creativity	 is	 similarly	 enhanced	 by	 open,	 distributed	
collaboration.				
	 The	 growing	 awareness	 among	 publicly	 funded	 researchers	 of	 the	 socially	
important	 functional	 roles	 played	 by	 specific,	 institutionalized	 open	 science	 practices,	
fortunately,	 has	 not	 spared	 these	 from	 periodic	 searching	 evaluations	 and	 some	 sharp	
criticism	 within	 the	 academic	 science	 community.	 	 Peer‐reviewing	 of	 research	
contributions	submitted	 for	 journal	publication,	has	been	one	such	practice	 that	early	 in	
the	 eighteenth	 century	 already	was	drawing	 criticisms	within	England’s	Royal	 Society	 ‐‐	
well	 before	 that	 practice	 became	 institutionalized	 and	 widely	 established	 with	 the	
professionalization	 of	 scientific	 research	 during	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 following	 century.	
Today	it	remains	a	perennial	subject	of	complaints	and	proposals	for	reform.	A	noteworthy	
recent	case	 in	point	 is	the	systematically	documented	critique	in	the	pages	Science	of	the	
unanticipated	 degradation	 of	 the	 performance	 of	 peer‐review,	 and	 generally	 poor	
standards	 of	 journal	 editing	 that	 has	 accompanied	 the	 explosive	 growth	 of	 predatory	
profit‐seeking	“open	access	journals”	in	the	worldwide	enterprise	of	scientific	publishing.41		
                                                 
40	Here	it	may	be	useful	to	be	specific:	e.g.,	among	prominent	U.S.	open	data	centers	and	archives:	GenBank,	
the	Protein	Data	Bank,	 Space	 science	 data	 centers;	 among	 the	 federated	 open	data	 networks:	World	Data	
Centers,	Global	Biodiversity	 Information	 Facility,NASA	Distributed	Active	Archive	Centers;	 among	publicly	













This,	 of	 course,	 is	 but	 one	 among	 the	 problematic	 aspects	 of	 the	 actually	 workings	 of	
institutions	 formed	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 open	 science,	 and	 hardly	 alone	 in	 warranting	
serious	remedial	attention	and	mechanisms	for	better	governance	.42		
	 	Institutional	 and	 organizational	 creativity	 has	 gone	 hand‐in‐hand	 with	
technological	 initiatives	 supporting	 open	 access	 and	 efficient	 search	 and	 retrieval	 of	
information	and	data	resources.	Perhaps	the	most	familiar	and	immediately	consequential	






communities	 emerged	with	new	 	new	 tools	 for	 creative	 collaboration	 that	were	used	by	
large	 numbers	 of	 volunteers	 in	 distributed	 peer‐production	 organizations	 that	 rapidly	
released	(and	debugged)	successive	versions	of	their	code.43	The	practical	viability	of	these	
large	 projects	 rested	 heavily	 upon	 the	 “copy‐left”	 clause	 of	 the	 General	 Public	 License	
(GPL‐GNU),	 under	 which,	 typically,	 their	 software	 products	 were	 released.	 	 “Copy‐left”	
licensing,	in	effect,	re‐purposed	the	protections	afforded	to	individual	holders	of	software	
copyrights	by	utilizing	contract	law	to	construct	a	de	facto	“commons”	within	which	new	
bodies	 of	 code,	 and	 subsequent	 modifications,	 extensions	 and	 adaptations	 for	 novel	
applications	could	continue	to	shared	freely	with	others.			
	 This	 particular	way	 of	 licensing	 copyrighted	material,	making	 the	 source	 code	 of	
computer	 programs	 available	 on	 a	 royalty‐free	 basis	 for	 use	 by	 the	 licensee’s	 non‐
commercial	purposes,	and	redistribution	to	others	on	the	same	terms,	was	an	innovative	
contractual	mechanism	devised	by	Richard	Stallman	and	other	expert	programmers	who	
joined	 him	 in	 pioneering	 the	 free	 (and	 open	 source)	 software	 movement.44	 	 They	 had	
trained	and	worked	in	academic	research	settings	during	the	1970s,	where,	in	accord	with	
the	 still‐prevailing	 norms	 of	 academic	 (open)	 science	 projects,	 the	 code	 they	 wrote	 for	
computer	operating	systems	and	applications	was	left	in	the	public	domain.		Subsequently,	
                                                 
42 For discussion of sources of inefficiency in the open science reward system, and other important problems of 
socially sub-opitimal resource allocation affecting academic research, see Dasgupta and David (1994: sects. 5-6).  
43 See, e.g.,Benkler (2002, 2006); Feller et al. (2005). 
44	 See	 Stallman	 (2002);	 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_software_movement,	 and	 references	 therein	 to	
the	founding	role	of	Stallman’s	GNU	project	at	MIT	in	1983.	




however,	 some	 among	 those	programs	were	 taken	up,	 re‐expressed	 and	 copyrighted	by	
commercial	software	vendors	in	the	early	1980’s	who	were	charging	high	prices	for	their	






took	 the	 initiative	 of	 responding	 constructively	 (in	 a	 double	 sense)	 creating	 GPL‐GNU	
license,	using	it	to	release	his	software,	and	promoting	its	wider	adoption.	.		
	 For	 natural	 science	 researchers	 in	 particular,	 the	 sudden	 advent	 of	 open	 source	
software,	 and	 the	 recognition	 of	 its	 roots	 in	 the	 traditional	 code‐sharing	 practices	 of	
academic	 science,	had	 the	effect	of	 reifying	 the	 idea	of	 “open	 science”	as	a	 form	of	 “self‐
help”	to	secure	continuing	access	to	the	digital	research	tools	that	regarded	–	‐along	with	





Science”	 was	 used	—albeit	 not	 with	 any	 of	 the	 broader	 institutional	 connotations	 that	




                                                 
45	The	“copyleft”	provision	of	the	GPL	license	enjoined	a	license‐holder	who	distributed	the	software	code	to	
others	enjoined	them	to	make	it	available	on	the	same	free	and	open	terms	on	which	they	had	received	it	‐‐	




46 See the conference main webpage (http://openscience.bnl.gov), which is the first place the term “Open Science” 
appeared on a U.S. government website, but in no other connection than the federal status of the BNL which hosted 
the conference. The “Motivations” page of this site declared that: “Open Source/Open Science is a unique 
conference: scientists, who rely heavily on the Internet and many open source projects to advance their research, are 
brought together with some of the leading figures in the Open Source community [e.g., Bruce Perrens] for the first 
time”.  Coincidentally, and purely by chance, the first use of the term “open science” in my publications occurred 
shortly thereafter, in David (2000) -- a SIEPR Discussion Paper that drew upon material prepared for an invited 
presentation  to the World Bank ABCDE conference held in Paris earlier that year, in 2000,  the text of which was 
publicly distributed along with other conference papers by the Bank after a two-year delay (see David 2002).  




a	White	House	event	held	in	June	2013,	at	which	“Obama Administration officials honored 13 
extraordinary leaders and organizations selected as ‘Champions of Change’ for their work using 
and promoting open scientific data and publications to grow our economy and improve our 
world.”47		
	 		The	idea	of	“copy‐left”	pioneered	by	the	open	source	software	movement	has	had	
wider	 and	 more	 profound	 ramifications	 by	 	 inspiring	 the	 beginnings	 of	 a	 kindred	
movement	 to	 develop	 the	 tailored	 uses	 of	 “contractually	 constructed	 commons”	 for	
purposes	 beyond	 	 preserving	 and	 facilitating	 future	 sharing	 of	 existing	 intangible	 and	
tangible	research	resources	that	can	be	accessed	on	the	Internet.48		Common‐use	licensing,	
by	effecting	the	contractual	“pooling”	of	specific	bodies	of	information	and	data	that	have	
been	 protected	 under	 intellectual	 property	 law,	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 way	 to	 liberating	
particular	 scientific	 projects	 and	 entire	 research	 programs	 from	 the	 costly,	 time‐




	 Thus,	 the	Neurocommons	 Project,	 a	 collaboration	 between	 Science	 Commons	 and	
the	Teranode	Corporation,	50	undertook	to	accelerate	the	progress	of	research	in	that	field	
                                                 
47		See	http://www.whitehouse.gove/blog/2013/06/21/celebrating‐open‐science‐champions‐change‐white‐
house	 .	 Although	 long	 in	 coming,	 this	 public	 acknowledgement	 (at	 the	 Presidential	 level	 of	 the	 U.S.	
government)	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 institutionalized	 open	 science	 principles	 and	 the	 enhancement	 of	
capabilities	 for	 implementing	 them	 in	 collaborative	 research,	 was	 an	 encouraging	 omen	 regarding	 the	
institution’s	 survival.	 In	 	 itself,	 it	 hardly	 can	 be	 taken	 as	 assuring	 the	 institution’s	 future,	 or	 even	
supportive	federal	government	efforts.						
48 On	 the	 contractual	 construction	 of	 “commons”	 for	 shared	 use	 of	 intangible	 (digital)	 scientific	 research	
resources	see	the	important	early	scholarly	contribution	by	Reichman	and	Uhlir	(2003),	as	well	as	David	and	
Spence	 (2003,	 2008)	 on	 legal	 and	 organizational	 issues.	 For	 the	 extension	of	 this	 approach	 to	 the	 case	of	
tangible	research	resources,	specifically	the	construction	of	“the	microbial	commons”	and	other	applications,	
see	 Dedeurwaedere	 (2010,	 2011),	 and	 National	 Research	 Council	 (2011).	 Reichman,	 Uhlir	 and	
Dedeurwaedere	 (forthcoming,	 2015)	 formulate	principles	 for	 the	design	of	 governance	arrangements	 that	
could	 be	 adapted	 to	 idiosyncratic	 requirements	 of	 particular	 research	 communities,	 while	 permitting	
subsequent	“federated	commons”	to	evolve	and	function	effectively.		 
49 On the conditions for “economically efficient” patent pools, and the avoidance of the abuse of common-use 
licensing for anti-competitive purposes, see David (2010) and references therein.  
50	 See	 http://neurocommons.org/page/Main_Page	 and	 http://neurosicience.org.	 Creative	 Commons	 (CC,	
hereinafter)	 is	 a	 501(c)(e)	 non‐profit	 tax‐exempt	 organization	 chartered	 in	 Massachusetts	 and	 currently	
headquartered	 in	 Mountain	 View,	 CA:	 http://www.creativecommons.org.	 It	 was	 founded	 in	 2001	 by	
Lawrence	Lessig	(then	at	Stanford),	Hal	Abelson	(MIT)	and	Eric	Eldred	(at	the	time	an	independent	scholar	
and	literary	agent	in	Boston),	with	the	purpose	of	expanding	the	corpus	of	creative	works	that	are	publicly	
available	 and	 shared,	 	 by	 	 developing	 a	 range	 of	 alternative	 copyright	 licenses	 and	 making	 them	 freely	
available.	 In	 2005,	 Lessig	 founded	 Science	 Commons	 (http://www.sciencecommons.org)	 as	 a	 semi‐
autonomous	 program	 of	 CC	 in	 2005,	 with	 the	 parallel	 purpose	 of	 creating	 legal	 (and	 later	 technical)	
infrastructures	 for	the	open	distribution	and	sharing	of	scientific	 information	and	data.	 [Disclosure	notice;	





commons	 ‐‐	 the	 contents	 of	 which	 are	 digital,	 online,	 free	 of	 charge,	 and	 freed	 of	 most	
copyright	and	licensing	restrictions	for	use	by	neuroscience	research	projects.	Further,	the	
constructed	 “neuroscience	 patent	 commons”	 forms	 a	 base	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	
“semantic	 web”	 that	 links	 publications,	 datasets	 and	 working‐paper	 and	 journal	 and	




	 “Bottom	 up”	 initiatives	 on	 the	 part	 of	 publicly	 funded	 researchers	 have	 been	
creating		 	specialized	and	sophisticated	technical,	organizational	and	legal	infrastructures	
appropriate	 for	 their	collaborative	scientific	work.	 	But,	 the	existence	of	 those	structures	
had	 further,	 external	 effects.	 They	 provided	 concrete	 exemplars	 that	 stimulated	 and	
rendered	more	feasible	a	variety	of	policy	actions	and	regulatory	measures	by	government	
science	agencies,	which	 in	 turn	 reinforced	and	broadened	 the	movement	 to	provide	and	
protect	 conditions	 of	 open	 and	 timely	 global	 access	 to	 scientific	 data	 and	 information.		
Starting	in	the	United	States,	such	government	actions	eventually	were	taken	up	in	varying	
degrees	 by	 Canada,	 United	 Kingdom,	 France,	 Germany,	 Switzerland,	 the	 Netherlands,	
Finland,	Australia,	and	South	Africa.	The	 international	percolation	of	 these	governmental	
policy	 measures	 was	 stimulated	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 guided	 by	 the	 coordination	 and	
dissemination	activities	that	stemmed	from	sustained	efforts	within	the	OECD	to	develop	a	
common	 set	 of	 “recommended	 principles	 and	 guidelines	 to	 promote	 access	 to	 publicly	
funded	research	data”.52	
                                                                                                                                                            
the	author	served	as	a	member	of	Science	Commons	Scientific	Advisory	Board	from	2005	until	2009	when	
the	 organization	 was	 re‐absorbed	 into	 CC,	 where	 work	 on	 the	 neurocommons	 semantic	 web	 project		
continued.						
51 See http://www.sagebase.org. Sage Bionetworks, founded as a non-profit research organization in 2009, has a 
lineage dating back to 1994, when Stephen Friend and Lee Hartwell launched the “Seattle Project” whose purpose 
was “to link genetics and drug discovery, based on the assumption that pattern recognition could allow researchers 
to intuit cellular activity directly from data as opposed to using hypothesis-driven, narrative approaches to biology.” 
The organization’s technology platforms facilitate collaboration on data, while its governance platforms enable data 
sharing and reuse, run challenges to solve complex biomedical problems, as well as conducting its own 
computational biology research. A draft statement of  six “Commons Principles” for open, contributor-driven 
genomic research and progressive community engagement to define behaviors and processes for those working in 
the Commons computational environment, and more generally “for researchers interested in cooperative, data-
intensive science and patient advocacy” was approved at the Sage Bionets annual Congress, held in San Francisco 
in April 2011, and, after further revisions, was approved by the organization’s Board of Directors (see 
http://sagebase.org/2011/06/13/principles/).  Dr. Stephen Friend, who has led this organization was among the 
“heroes of Open Science” hailed at  the White House-OSTP celebration  in June 2013 (see note 46 supra).   
52 See OECD (2007), the eventual outcome the Working Party’s years of effort to produce a consensus document.  




	 	Such	 “top	 down”	 policy	 initiatives	 were	 able	 to	 point	 to	 principles	 and	 models	
provided	by	the	earlier	practical	successes	of	major	international	scientific	collaborations	





to	 thwart	 the	 patenting	 of	 genotype	 data	with	 potential	 commercially	 uses	 and	 thereby	
secure	open	data‐sharing.53		
	 The	main	lessons	and	implications	for	the	future	vitality	of	open	science	institutions	
that	 can	be	drawn	 from	 the	 foregoing	 selective	 sketch	of	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	past	 15	
years	 is	 that	 research	 communities	 of	 this	 kind	 possess	 not	 only	 the	 technical	 and	
organizational	 ingenuity,	but	also	the	organizational	capabilities	to	apply	them	to	sustain	
their	 culture	 and	 protect	 their	 characteristically	 efficient	 collaborative	 modes	 of	
conducting	 socially	 valuable	 exploratory,	 fundamental	 research.	 To	 go	 on	 doing	 this,	
however,	they	must	be	adequately	supported	by	external,	public	and	charitable	sources	of	
funding,	 and	nurtured	by	 “top	down”	public	 policy	 actions	 that	 reinforce	 and	help	 them	

















                                                 
53 The “Haplotide Map” is a database tool that was created to greatly reduce the cost and time of identifying blocks 
of sequenced DNA containing genes and genetic variations that affect health and disease. Work on the HapMap 
project   initiated by the Human Genome Project in 2001 has been continued under the National Human Genome 
Research Institute (see https://www.genome.gov/10001688).  
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